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ABSTRACT 
 
Inflation Targeting in Emerging Countries: 
 The Exchange Rate Issues. (August 2003) 
Javier Arturo Reyes Altamirano,  
B.A., Instituto Tecnologico y de Estudios Superiores de Monterrey, 
Campus Estado de México 
Chair of Advisory Committee: Dr. Leonardo Auernheimer 
 
The current discussion of Inflation Targeting (IT) in emerging economies deals 
with the effects that nominal exchange rate movements have on the overall inflation 
rate. The literature has focused in the analysis of the advantages and disadvantages that 
IT has with respect to other monetary policy regimes and the relevancy of the nominal 
exchange rate pass-through effect into inflation. So far none of them have dealt with 
the differences arising from the policy instruments used to fight off inflationary 
pressure under an IT regime. The literature on IT for emerging economies can be 
separated in two categories. In the first category the monetary authority uses interest 
rate policy as the instrument variable to implement and control the inflation target. The 
second category illustrates when the monetary authorities use international reserves as 
the instrument to influence the nominal exchange rate in such a way that the 
depreciation rate is consistent with the overall inflation target. This dissertation 
presents a model in which both policy instruments are available to the monetary 
authority. This model is used to address two questions: i) Is IT better than a monetary 
rule regime? and ii) Is it better to intervene directly in the foreign exchange market 
rather than use interest rate policy to control exchange rate pressure on inflation, or are 
they equivalent? The results show that there are important differences between these 
choices and the answers to these questions are shock dependent. These differences 
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arise because the intervention needed under IT is accompanied by important output 
costs or benefits depending on the direction of the shock being analyzed. 
Regarding the pass-through effect, some studies have shown that the pass-
through effect from currency depreciation into inflation has been decreasing and 
therefore is becoming less of an issue for these countries. The literature has offered 
different explanations for these declines but so far they have not been directly linked to 
the adoption of IT. This dissertation shows that lower pass-through levels can be a 
natural result of fear of floating observed in emerging countries that adopted IT and 
therefore exchange rate effects on inflation are still relevant.  
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CHAPTER I 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
After the currency crises that took place in the mid and late nineties, several 
emerging economies moved away from fixed exchange rate regimes towards more 
flexible arrangements . Several of these countries, like Brazil, the Czech Republic and 
Thailand introduced Inflation Targeting (IT) as their monetary policy regime1. Before 
these events the IT literature was focused on the developed countries that implemented 
this regime in the early nineties2. Due to the need to understand how IT would be 
implemented and how it would work in emerging economies several studies have 
recently surfaced in the literature in an attempt to address these concerns.  
IT requires that the monetary authorities announce a numerical target for the 
inflation rate (point or range). They must also have a strong and credible commitment 
to price stability as the prime objective of the central bank accompanied with central 
bank independence and more transparent and clear communication with the public and 
the markets detailing the instruments that will be used to achieve and maintain the 
inflation target. 
 Masson, Savastano and Sharma (1997) laid the foundations of the analysis of IT 
in emerging economies by looking at how well these economies matched the desired 
characteristics. Their conclusions were that  these requirements were largely unmet 
among emerging economies, either because of the heavy dependence of government 
revenue on seigniorage or because there was no firm commitment to having a low 
inflation rate as the overriding objective of the central bank. They also mentioned that 
IT in developed countries was adopted under conditions that are rarely found in 
emerging markets. These conditions are low initial inflation rates, considerable 
exchange rate flexibility and substantial central bank independence. More recently 
                                                
  This dissertation follows the style of the American Economic Review. 
1 Mishkin and Schmidt-Hebbel (2001). 
2 Bernanke, B.S., Laubach, T., Mishkin, F.S. and Posen, A.S. (1999). 
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Mishkin and Savastano (2001), and Agenor (2000) concluded that some medium and 
high income emerging economies may be able to implement IT. Not surprisingly these 
are emerging markets that after some years have achieved relatively low inflation rates, 
noticeable central bank independence and can refrain from implicit exchange rate 
targeting. 
 Currently, Brazil, Chile, the Czech Republic, Hungry, Korea, Mexico, Peru, 
Poland, and Thailand are all using IT as their monetary policy regime. Given the strong 
pace of adoption over the past five years, the literature has moved from analyzing 
implementation issues to analyzing technical issues of how IT should be practiced in 
emerging markets and how recommendable it is for these countries to have it and for 
others to adopt it. The discussion seems to be around the issues of fiscal dominance 
and the exchange rate effects on inflation. 
 The discussion around fiscal dominance, characterized by high levels of 
government deficits and strong dependence of the government revenue on seigniorage, 
came to a logical conclusion very quickly. The effects and inconsistencies of fiscal 
dominance for IT are the same as for any other regime. Governments pursuing 
persistent and significant fiscal imbalances under IT will eventually cause the collapse 
of the program: fiscal imbalances will have to be monetized or sudden and large 
depreciations will be used to erode public debt followed by high levels of inflation. 
Kumhof, Li and Yan (2001) illustrate the fiscal dominance issues when they 
analyze the vulnerability of IT regimes to speculative attacks. If the government 
pursues  an inconsistent monetary-fiscal policy mix the commitment to the inflation 
target forces the central bank to intervene in the foreign exchange rate market allowing 
a balance of payment crisis under an IT regime. The intervention by the central bank is 
directly in the foreign exchange market through the use of international reserves. They 
conclude that there are two differences between having IT instead of an exchange rate 
target. First the speculative attack under an IT regimes take place over a short period of 
time rather than instantaneously, as is the case under an exchange rate target. Second, 
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the loss of reserves attributable to the attack under IT is smaller and increasing in the 
share of tradable goods in total consumption. 
Regarding the exchange rate effects on inflation Eichengreen (2002) and 
Mishkin and Savastano (2001) emphasize the differences that should be considered 
when analyzing IT in emerging economies. The analysis should make the distinction 
between open-economy and developing country aspects. He addresses the question of 
how the IT framework should be extended to take into account the shocks that 
emerging economies are prone to. Specifically noting the fact that the analysis of IT in 
emerging economies should consider their historically high pass-through effect from 
exchange rate movements into inflation, the difficulty of forecasting inflation in a 
volatile environment and liability dollarization issues3,4. The forecasting difficulties 
and the high levels of debt denominated in a foreign currency affect directly the 
credibility of the IT regime just as they do in any other monetary regime. On the other 
hand the nominal exchange rate pass-through effect into inflation is particularly 
relevant for IT. In these countries different shocks cause exchange rate movements that 
translate into inflationary pressure and threaten to destabilize the economy. Under these 
circumstances a central bank implementing IT will be unwilling to let the exchange 
rate move and will intervene directly or indirectly in the foreign exchange market. 
 These possible interventions bring about another matter of contention in the IT 
literature related to the nominal exchange rate. This has emerged from the literature of 
“dirty floating or “fear of floating”. Relevant studies in this literature include Calvo 
and Reinhart (2000), Reinhart (2000) and Lahiri and Vegh (2001). The conclusions of 
this literature are that for differing reasons most of the countries that claim to have a 
flexible exchange rate actually intervene directly or indirectly in the foreign exchange 
rate market trying to avoid high exchange rate volatility, the pure fear of floating 
argument, or to avoid output fluctuations. Many of the countries that claim to have an 
                                                
3 Goldfajn and Ribeiro da Costa Werland (2000) analyze empirically the historical pass-through effect 
for a panel of countries and show that this effect is considerably higher in emerging economies with 
respect to that observed in developed countries.    
4 Dollarization issues are those related to high levels of debt denominated in foreign currencies. 
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IT regime as their monetary policy framework have been included in the list of fear of 
floating countries. 
The exchange rate issues for IT, basically fear of floating and the pass-through 
effect, have been identified and acknowledged in the recent literature and the discusson 
seems to be moving from a description mode to a mode of addressing the questions of 
how to deal with the issues, what the consequences are under IT and, what the 
advantages or disadvantages of IT are with respect to other monetary regimes. Some 
studies that lead the way into this new literature for IT include Kumhof (2001), Gali 
and Monacelli (2002), and Parrado and Velasco (2001).  
Kumhof (2001) takes on the task of analyzing the differences between IT, a 
flexible exchange rate under monetary rules, and exchange rate targets. He concludes 
that it is very unclear whether IT is a superior policy in the face of different exogenous 
shocks, including changes in the real international interest rate, international inflation, 
inverse velocity and tradable income. He argues that the attractiveness of IT may lie in 
the fact that this regime gives the policymaker discretion. 
With a different approach Parrado and Velasco use a simple dynamic neo-
Keynesian model of a small open economy to examine the effects of different 
exchange rate regimes and inflation target indicators in the context of monetary policy 
rules. They use a welfare based approach to analyze the differences between having a 
policy rule that reacts to output gaps and exchange rate misalignments, and not only to 
inflation gaps between the target and the current inflation rate. They also extend their 
analysis to the fact that central banks could target domestic inflation only instead of the 
CPI. They conclude that the effects of inflation targeting on output depend crucially  on 
the exchange rate regime and on the inflation index being targeted. They argue that the 
social loss under different shocks is much higher under managed exchange rates than 
under flexible exchange rates and also that targeting domestic goods inflation appears 
to outperform CPI targeting.  
The study by Gali and Monacelli (2002) focuses on the analysis between three 
different monetary policy regimes: domestic inflation targeting, CPI targeting and an 
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exchange rate peg. The response of the monetary authorities to domestic and foreign 
productivity shocks under each regime, specified in terms of an interest rate rule, has 
different effects on the real and nominal exchange rate resulting in different volatility 
levels of the exchange rate as well as different output and inflation gaps. The authors 
use welfare analysis to rank the regimes, noting that domestic inflation targeting 
dominates the other two in terms of welfare.  
 These studies have shown the differences between IT and other monetary 
policy regimes for different shocks that affect the exchange rate, but so far none of 
them have dealt with the differences arising from the policy instruments used to fight 
off inflationary pressure under an IT regime. Basically, the literature on policy 
instruments under IT can be separated in two categories. In the first category, the 
monetary authority uses a Taylor-type interest rate rule as the policy instrument to 
implement and control the inflation target; the interest rate reacts to output and 
inflation gaps and in the case of open economies they include, sometimes, a nominal or 
a real exchange rate gap5. The second category corresponds to those cases where the 
monetary authorities use international reserves as the instrument to influence the 
nominal exchange rate in such a way that the depreciation rate matches the necessary 
rate to comply with the overall inflation target. The next step is to merge both 
approaches into one comprehensive model, such that both policy instruments are 
available to the monetary authority. In reality central banks have access to both 
instruments and the economic consequences of using one or the other may result in 
relevant welfare differences for the economy in question.  
Concerning the pass-through effect from exchange rate movements into 
inflation and its relevancy for IT in emerging economies, the literature has studied the 
correlation between the inflation rate and the depreciation rate, as well as estimated the 
share of depreciation that translates into inflation over a given period of time6. Most of 
the studies have found that the pass-through effect has recently been decreasing in 
                                                
5 Svensson, L.E.O. (2000) and Eichengreen (2001) illustrate these Taylor-type interest rate rules. 
6 In this sense, the pass-through effect analysis takes into consideration the short run and the long run by 
looking at different periods of time.  
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these countries and offer multiple explanations for these declines. Furthermore, some 
authors even argue that given the lower pass-through effects observed recently, 
domestic currency depreciation effects on inflation may no longer be an issue for 
emerging economies that adopted IT.  
The interpretations of and for the declining pass-through effect include those by 
Mishkin and Savastano (2001), Leiderman and Bar-or (2000), and Schmidt – Hebbel 
and Werner (2002). Using different methodologies and arguments they all conclude 
that the pass-through effect depends on the credibility of the IT regime and therefore it 
is likely to decline over time as the IT commitment becomes clearer. Taylor (2000), 
Baqueiro, Diaz de Leon, and Torres (2002), and Choudhri and Hakura (2001) relate the 
exchange rate pass-through to the inflation environment. They argue and show 
empirically that when the inflation rate is low, individual’s expectations are more likely 
to be in line with the authority’s target and therefore will be less influenced by short 
term exchange rate movements7. Garcia and Restrepo (2001) show that for the past 
decade the decrease in the pass-through effect for Chile was related to negative output 
gaps that compensated the inflationary effects of the currency depreciation. Finally 
Campa and Goldberg (2002) in their study of 25 OECD countries argue that the most 
important determinants of the changes in the pass-through over time are 
microeconomic and are related to the industry composition of a country’s import 
bundle. 
So far none of these explanations or arguments link the decrease of the pass-
through effect directly to the adoption of IT even though the reasoning used in some of 
these studies explicitly argues that central banks implementing IT may intervene in the 
foreign exchange rate market (fear of floating) in order to smooth or control the effects 
of sudden exchange rate movements on the inflation rate. If these interventions do take 
                                                
7 The data set used by Baqueiro, Diaz de Leon, and Torres (2002), and Choudhri and Hakura (2001) 
includes data for several emerging economies that adopted IT during the past few years. The authors 
divide the dataset into two sub-samples, one for the high inflation periods and the other for the low 
inflation periods. They show that the pass-through effect is lower for the low inflation sample but they 
do not elaborate on the fact that this sub-sample corresponds to the time period where most of these 
countries adopted IT. 
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place, the monetary authorities counteract sudden exchange rate movements and 
therefore the direct relation between inflation and currency depreciation breaks down. 
It is possible that the results of these interventions are lower correlation coefficients 
between inflation and domestic currency depreciation and lower pass-through effects. 
In accordance with the current discussion of IT in emerging economies the 
objectives of this dissertation are to analyze the differences that emerge from using 
different monetary policy instruments to comply with the inflation target, and to 
investigate the relationship between the declining correlation between inflation and 
depreciation, lower pass-through effects, and the adoption of IT. The empirical analysis 
presented in Chapter II uses data for Brazil, Chile, and Mexico, three countries that 
adopted IT during the nineties, to show how the pass-through effect and the correlation 
between inflation and depreciation have been declining. This chapter also shows that 
these declines coincide with the time period in which these countries adopted IT, and, 
finally, presents evidence of fear of floating practices around the same time period. 
Central banks that exhibit fear of floating intervene directly or indirectly in the foreign 
exchange rate market. The instruments used for these interventions have different 
consequences for the real economy and the study of these differences is the motivation 
for the analysis presented in Chapters III and IV. Chapter III presents a comprehensive 
model in which the monetary authority can use international reserves or interest rate 
policy to fight off inflationary pressure emerging from sudden exchange rate 
movements that are the result of exogenous shocks.  
The literature has also been comparing IT with alternative monetary regimes 
that emerging economies could adopt. Usually the alternative to IT is a monetary rule 
(Friedman Rule) where the central bank fixes the rate of growth or the path for the 
nominal money stock. The comprehensive model of Chapter III is used in Chapter IV 
to model IT and the monetary rule regime and compare the results obtained for 
different shocks, including changes in the world interest rate or money demand shocks. 
In this sense the analysis of Chapter III is along the lines of Kumhof (2001) but, most 
importantly, it uses a model that allows the government to use either international 
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reserves or interest rate policy as policy instruments to implement IT, while allowing 
for comparisons with the rate of money growth rule. As a final point, Chapter IV shows 
that the declining correlation between inflation and depreciation as well as the lower 
pass-through effects observed recently can be related to the adoption of IT in emerging 
economies.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  9 
 
 
 
 
CHAPTER II 
 
EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS OF THE EXCHANGE RATE PASS-THROUGH EFFECT 
INTO INFLATION AND FEAR OF FLOATING IN BRAZIL, CHILE, AND 
MEXICO 
 
A. Introduction 
 
The objective of this chapter is to present empirical evidence regarding the 
pass-through effect and Fear of Floating practices in emerging economies that adopted 
Inflation Targeting (IT). The countries included in this study are Brazil, Chile, and 
Mexico. Each respectively adopted IT in 1998, 1991, and 1997-1998. Even though 
these economies share various similarities given their inherit nature of being emerging 
economies, the ways and timing in which they each adopted IT is different. These 
similarities and differences offer the premises for the analysis of the pass-through 
effect which should consider both historical and temporary perspectives8. The cases of 
Chile and Mexico offer two different scenarios to analyze the pass-through effect for 
gradual adoption of inflation targeting while Brazil’s data will be used to analyze this 
effect when IT is adopted with a big–bang approach. 
This chapter seeks first to briefly review the implementation and evolution of 
IT in Brazil, Chile, and Mexico. The second section presents the analysis of the pass-
through effect from exchange rate depreciation into inflation. After identifying the 
pass-through effect and its recent evolution, the last section presents an empirical study 
of fear of floating practices for Brazil, Chile, and Mexico. The results obtained are then 
presented and compared with those of previous studies. 
 
 
                                                
8 “Historical perspective” refers to the analysis of the data using long periods of time while temporary 
refers to short periods of time. 
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B. Brief Review of Inflation Targeting Adoption and Evolution9 
 
1. Inflation Targeting Adoption 
Brazil followed a “big bang” strategy for the adoption of IT. After the balance 
of payment crisis of 1998 and the high depreciation of the currency that followed, 
Banco Central do Brasil, Brazil’s central bank, committed itself to controlling the pass-
through effect of exchange rate depreciation into inflation by imposing a restrictive 
monetary policy that was based on the framework of IT and dirty floating practices. 
After inflation expectations were restrained, the board of the central bank moved 
quickly towards the adoption of a full IT regime. During the early months of 1999 the 
institutional framework, basically central bank independence, was put in place, and by 
July of the same year the monetary authority was able to announce inflation targets for 
1999, 2000, and 2001.These targets were eight, six and four percent respectively with a 
tolerance band of two percent. Thus, this approach is considered a “big bang” approach 
because the inflation target was set to a one-digit level from the start and the target for 
2001 was comparable to those of developed economies using IT10. This approach 
contrasts with those in Chile and Mexico where the target moved slowly towards those 
of developed economies. 
Banco Central de Chile, Chile’s central bank, initiated a gradual approach 
towards IT in September 1990 when it announced the inflation target for 1991, as a 
range target within a fifteen to twenty percent range, and continued doing so until 
1999. During this year it announced the target for 2000 and also declared that from 
2001 onwards the inflation target would be a range target within the limits of two and 
four percent per year. The IT gradual adoption was preceded by important institutional 
changes that gave the central bank both goal and instrument independence. With the 
gradual approach, the central bank also maintained an exchange rate target that started 
                                                
9 See Mishkin (2000), Mishkin and Savastano (2000), and Corbo and Schmidt-Hebbel (2001) for more 
information and details about IT in emerging economies. 
10 Sweden, Canada, Australia target inflation at levels of three percent. For more on Inflation Targeting 
for developed countries refer to Bernanke, et al (2001). 
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in 1984 and lasted until 1999. By 1999 Chile had the necessary requirements in place 
for IT, including an independent central bank, a credible commitment to low and stable 
inflation rates as the main objective of the monetary authority, and no commitments to 
controlling the exchange rate, or, in other words, a full-fledged inflation targeting 
regime. 
In the case of Mexico, the continuing advance to the full adoption of IT started 
at the end of 1997 after Banco de Mexico, Mexico’s central bank, started moving away 
from the monetary targeting regime that had been implemented after the currency crisis 
and financial crisis that took place in 1994 – 1995, better known as the Tequila Crisis. 
During 1998 and 1999 the monetary authority in the annual monetary reports presented 
an extensive analysis of the monetary policy actions implemented during 1997 and 
1998. From these reports it is evident that monetary policy was being more responsive 
to inflation instead of responding to misalignments of the monetary target11. Finally in 
1999, Banco de Mexico announced the inflation targets for 1999 through 2002 and 
made a commitment to achieve a three percent inflation rate for 2002 onwards. During 
the late 1990s, the central bank’s institutional framework was modified in order to 
break the political cycle of the monetary authority given fiscal dominance issues. The 
new framework strengthened the independence of the central bank since the governor 
is chosen in the third year of the current presidential administration, which lasts for 6 
years. The governor cannot be replaced until the third year of the next administration. 
The fiscal dominance issue was addressed by having the central bank set the inflation 
target for the next three to five years in conjunction with the ministry of finance so that 
any fiscal adjustments within this time frame have to take into account the inflation 
target. 
 
                                                
11 Exposición sobre la Política Monetaria para 1998 y 1999 (Monetary Policy Reports for  1998 and 
1999).  
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2. Experience with Inflation Targeting 
It is important to realize that Brazil, Chile, and Mexico have had different 
experiences with IT. If the realized inflation rates and the inflation targets are 
compared for the three countries, it can be observed that each has experienced 
misalignments between the two. Figure 1 shows the inflation targets (point or range) 
and the observed inflation rates for Brazil, Chile, and Mexico. Chile adopted a full-
fledged IT in 1999, but the central bank missed the target for the first two years of the 
regime, when there was a point target rather than a range target. However, upon 
implementation of a range target the inflation rate has been within target range. Mexico 
missed the target in 1998, a year before the official adoption of IT, showed some 
recovery in 1999, the year of IT adoption, and has been roughly on target from 2000 
through 2002. Brazil, with its “big bang” approach, was able to maintain the realized 
inflation rate within the IT range for 1999 and 2000, but since then the realized 
inflation rate has been above the upper limit by almost two percent in 2001 and seven 
percent in 2002. 
Mexico
0.0
15.0
30.0
45.0
60.0
1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003
%
Annual Inflation Rate
Inflation Target
Brazil
0.0
5.0
10.0
15.0
20.0
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003
%
Annual Inflation Rate
  Inflation Target + 2%
  Inflation Target - 2%
Chile
0.0
7.0
14.0
21.0
28.0
1991 1992 1994 1996 1998 2000 2002
%
Annual Inflation Rate
Inflation Target
Upper Limit
 Lower Limit
Fig. 1. Realized Annual Inflation Rates and Inflation Targets for Brazil, Chile, 
 and Mexico. 
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Each of these countries has taken into consideration the fact that the regime 
must be as transparent as possible. In order to maintain this transparency, the monetary 
authorities prepare monetary reports, inflation reports, and other types of documents on 
a monthly, quarterly, or biannual basis. These reports explain the measures that have 
been undertaken to maintain the realized inflation consistent with the target, and in case 
the target is not met, either by undershooting or overshooting it, the central bank must 
make public a document, sometimes called an open letter, explaining the exact reasons 
for the breach and the policies undertaken to counteract the deviation. For these 
purposes, each central bank maintains a database where the public can access the 
documents12. In both 2001 and 2002, the governor of the central bank of Brazil sent 
two open letters explaining the reasons why the target was not met. The board of 
governors of the central bank of Mexico presents a quarterly report for inflation, while 
the central bank of Chile publishes on a biannual basis a monetary policy report where 
they comment on the actions taken to counteract the misalignments of the realized 
inflation and the target.  
Therefore it is possible to conclude that Brazil, Chile, and Mexico have the 
necessary institutional requirements to implement IT but the annual inflation rates have 
not been strictly in line with the target rates. The monetary authorities of these 
countries have elaborated the reasons for these misalignments, including the inflation 
of controlled prices or commodity prices, wages, and the exchange rate. Wages and 
controlled prices are considered more predictable than the exchange rate and 
commodity prices. Commodity prices, like oil prices, are reflected mainly on 
controlled prices. But the exchange rate, which under IT is “flexible”, is affected by 
both exogenous and endogenous shocks that are not easily foreseen or predicted13. 
Once these shocks take place, monetary policy tools can be used to counteract or 
reduce their effects on the exchange rate. 
                                                
12 These databases can be accessed online at www.bcb.gov.br  for Brazil, www.bcentral.cl for Chile and 
www.banxico.org.mx for Mexico. 
13 The extent to which the nominal exchange rate is flexible under IT will be addressed in chapters III 
and IV of this dissertation. Calvo (2000) argues that the nominal exchange rate is not fully flexible under 
IT and under certain circumstances it resembles more a nominal exchange rate target. 
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For emerging countries that implement IT, if the exchange rate plays a relevant 
role in the determination of the price level then it is important to know the magnitude 
of the possible pass-through effect in order to determine how responsive monetary 
policy should be to unexpected shocks. The next section uses simple correlation and 
regression analyses for inflation and currency depreciation as a first step to analyzing 
the pass-through effect. Afterwards other econometric techniques are introduced to 
identify the magnitude of the effects of exchange rate movements on inflation for 
Brazil, Chile, and Mexico. 
 
 
C. Empirical Analysis of the Pass-Through Effect14 
 
This section presents the results of four different approaches utilized to provide 
empirical evidence of the pass-through from currency depreciation into inflation. Even 
though it is not the correct way to asses the magnitude of the pass-through effect, as it 
will be explained later on, a simple correlation analysis between inflation and currency 
depreciation is used as an initial approach. Following Garcia and Restrepo (2001) and 
Schmidt-Hebbel and Werner(2002) two correlation statistics have been computed15. 
The dataset is comprised of monthly observations of the annual inflation and 
depreciation rates for Brazil, Chile, and Mexico. The first statistic uses an increasing 
window with a fixed starting point that initially calculates the correlation coefficient for 
the first four years, and then one observation is added at a time thereafter. The second 
statistic uses a fully rolling window where the correlation coefficient is calculated for 
the first four years and then both the starting and ending dates move keeping the 
sample size constant. The datasets for Brazil, Chile, and Mexico include data from 
January 1993 to December 2002, January 1991 to December 2002, and January 1986 to 
December 2002, respectively. 
                                                
14 The exact description and the sources of the data are included in Appendix 1. 
15 Garcia and Restrepo (2001) studied the correlation between these two variables for the case of Chile 
by computing two rolling correlation statistics on monthly data for annual inflation and depreciation for 
the time period of January 1986 to December 2000. 
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Fig. 2. Correlation Analysis between the Annual Inflation and Depreciation Rates for 
Brazil (1993:01 – 2002:12), Chile (1991:01 – 2002:12), and Mexico (1986:01 – 
2002:12) with a Four Years Initial Window. 
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 The results presented in Figure 2 show that the correlation between inflation 
and currency depreciation is very different for the three countries. This relation has 
been and still is highly positive in the case of Mexico, but for Chile it has been 
decreasing consistently when calculated with the increasing window and also with the 
rolling windows methodology where it even became negative for the last five years 
considered. In the case of Brazil, the increasing window results show that the 
correlation between inflation and depreciation rates has been increasing over time, but 
this correlation became negative for the rolling window in 1999. It is important to note 
that the increasing window for Brazil takes into account some of the years of the 
hyperinflation that the country suffered during the early 1990’s. If the hyperinflation 
data is removed, January 1993 to April 1995, the correlation coefficient for the 
increasing window is negative for the sub-sample considered. 
 The correlation between the inflation rate and currency depreciation for Chile 
and Brazil became negative in 1999, the year in which the IT regime was fully adopted 
by both countries. The lower or even negative correlation coefficient is consistent with 
the results presented in the third chapter of this dissertation, where lower correlation 
coefficients are linked to interventions of the central bank that affect the nominal 
exchange rate. Intuitively the central bank will offset inflationary pressure from 
exchange rate movements by intervening directly or indirectly in the foreign exchange 
market. This intervention will result in lower rates of depreciation with respect to the 
inflation rate. Even in extreme cases, the intervention needed to comply with the 
inflation target will cause an appreciation of the currency in order to maintain the 
inflation rate adequately with the target. 
The reason why the correlation coefficients obtained should not be used to 
make definite statements about the magnitude of the pass-through effect of 
depreciation on inflation is because they just measure the degree to which two 
variables are linearly associated. Lower correlation coefficients may be the result of 
temporary nominal exchange rate overshooting, which may not necessarily result in 
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lower pass-through effects in the long run16. From now on I will not relate directly the 
results of lower correlation coefficients with lower pass-through effects, but Chapter IV 
shows that lower or even negative correlation between inflation and depreciation can 
be related to the adoption of IT in emerging economies. 
In order to measure the magnitude, following Garcia and Restrepo (2001) and 
Goldfajn and Ribeiro da Costa Werlang (2000), two different regression analyses were 
used. The first one regresses the annual inflation rate on a trend and currency 
depreciation, while the second uses currency depreciation, real exchange rate 
deviations, output gap, and past values of inflation as right hand side variables. Again, 
for both regressions, the increasing and rolling windows approaches were used. In 
contrast to the correlation coefficients presented above, the estimated coefficients for 
the accumulated depreciation obtained with these regressions can be used to make 
statements about the magnitude of the pass-through effect. They are estimations for the 
share of accumulated currency depreciation that translates into inflation over different 
periods of time. 
 Explicitly the first regression used the following equation: 
uTe ttt ++=Π 21 ˆ ββ   (1) 
where Tt and teˆ  respectively represent a time trend and currency depreciation. 
Estimated coefficients for the depreciation rate for increasing and rolling windows 
regressions are presented in Figure 3. The samples used for these regressions are the 
same as those used in the correlation analysis, but the initial windows are set to a range 
of five years. 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                
16 The simplest example of this is the model of exchange rate overshooting introduced by Dornbusch 
(1976).  
  18 
 
 
 
Brazil
Chile
Mexico
Increasing Window Estimated Coefficient for Depreciation Rolling Window Estimated Coefficient for Depreciation
Increasing Window Estimated Coefficient for Depreciation Rolling Window Estimated Coefficient for Depreciation
Increasing Window Estimated Coefficient for Depreciaton Rolling Window Estimated Coefficient for Depreciation
0.70
0.75
0.80
0.85
0.90
0.95
1.00
1991 1992 1994 1995 1997 1998 2000 2001
  Beta 1
B1 + s.e
B1  - s.e
0.00
0.20
0.40
0.60
0.80
1.00
1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002
 Beta 1
B1 + s.e
B1  - s.e
0.00
0.30
0.60
0.90
1.20
1.50
1.80
1991 1992 1994 1995 1997 1998 2000 2001
  Beta 1
B1 + s.e
B1  - s.e
-0.40
-0.20
0.00
0.20
0.40
0.60
0.80
1.00
1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002
  Beta 1
B1 + s.e
B1  - s.e
-0.40
-0.20
0.00
0.20
0.40
0.60
0.80
1.00
1.20
1.40
1.60
1.80
1998 1999 2000 2001 2002
  Beta 1
B1 + s.e
B1  - s.e
0.00
0.20
0.40
0.60
0.80
1.00
1.20
1999 2000 2001 2002
 Beta 1
B1 + s.e
B1  - s.e
 
Fig. 3. Estimated Coefficients for the Depreciation Rate in Equation (1) for Brazil 
(1993:01 – 2002:12), Chile (1991:01 – 2002:12), and Mexico (1986:01 – 2002:12) 
with a Five Years Initial Window. 
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The second regression used the following equation: 
     [ ] [ ] [ ]1,1513121,110, ˆ −+−−−−+−+ Π++++=Π jttttjttjtt DRERDIPIe βββββ         (2) 
where [ ]jtt +Π ,  and [ ]jtte +,ˆ  represent the accumulated inflation and depreciation rates  
over the period of t to t + j, respectively. DIPI is a measure of output gap, while DRER 
is the real exchange rate deviation. The real exchange rate is defined as the price of 
traded goods over the price of non-traded goods17. Both output gap and real exchange 
rate deviation are calculated as deviations from their Hodrick-Prescott trends18. The 
dataset uses the same samples as previous calculations and industrial production 
indices are used as proxies for output19. This regression attempts to capture inflationary 
pressure that arises from sources other than the depreciation of the currency.  
 Intuitively, a positive output gap produces inflationary pressure because 
increasing costs are passed on to consumers20. Regarding the real exchange rate, the 
intuition is related to the price stickiness of non-traded goods. When the real exchange 
rate is above its trend, there is inflationary pressure from the “catching-up” effect of the 
non-traded goods price level21. The sticky price assumption of non-traded goods is 
used in the theory model presented in chapter three.  
 The coefficients for equation (2) were estimated for five different accumulated 
inflation and depreciation rates, specifically one, three, six, nine, and twelve months, 
using the rolling and the increasing windows methodology. For example one of the 
                                                
17 For the case of Chile and Mexico the real exchange rate series were obtained directly from the website 
of their central banks. The real exchange rate from Brazil, was calculated from the price indices for 
traded and non-traded goods reported from the website of the central bank of Brazil. 
18 Hodrick-Prescott trends were calculated with a smoothing parameter of 14400 as is standard for 
monthly observations. 
19 January 1993 to December 2002, January 1991 to December 2002, and January 1986 to December 
2002, for Brazil, Chile, and Mexico respectively. The initial window is again set at five years. 
20 Goldfajn and Ribeiro da Costa Werlang (2000) also note that it is easier for firms to pass-through 
increases in costs to consumers when sales are increasing. 
21 Goldfajn and Valdes (1999) have shown that under this framework, if the currency depreciation is just 
enough to correct an overvaluation of the currency, then it would not translate into inflationary pressure. 
But currency depreciation that is not based on required adjustments of relative prices (real exchange 
rate) would induce inflation or would reverse itself (through nominal appreciation). Borensztein and De 
Gregorio (1999) have shown that usually the end result of large depreciations not based on correction of 
relative prices do indeed translate into inflationary pressure. 
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regression for the three months accumulated case would be the following: the 
accumulated inflation for the period April - June was regressed on the depreciation 
accumulated over the period of March to May, the industrial production index 
deviation present in March, real exchange rate deviation in March and the initial 
inflation, that is the accumulated inflation for the months of January to March. The 
logic behind the last three terms in this regression is that of reflecting the effects of the 
initial conditions on future inflation. The results for the estimated coefficients 
presented in Tables A.1.1 through A.1.6, included in Appendix 1, are presented as 
averages of the estimated coefficients for each year of the time period considered. For 
example, the increasing window estimated coefficient for depreciation for Chile in 
Table A.1.3 should be read as follows: the average estimated coefficients for currency 
depreciation for the increasing window regressions that include the months of January 
through December of 1996 are respectively 0.02, 0.18, 0.26, 0.23 and 0.25 for the one, 
three, six, nine, and twelve month accumulated rates regressions, while for the 
increasing window regressions that include the months of January through December 
of 2002 the coefficients for currency depreciation are (0.003), 0.01, 0.05, 0.05 and 0.05 
for the one, three, six, nine, and twelve month accumulated regressions. The tables also 
present the estimated coefficients for the other explanatory variables included, also in 
averages. In general the coefficients have the expected signs, positive for the output 
gap, real exchange rate deviation, accumulated depreciation, and initial inflation, while 
their statistical significance changes throughout the regressions. This section is 
dedicated to the analysis of the pass-through effect from currency depreciation into 
inflation, so emphasis is placed on extensively presenting the results obtained for the 
estimated coefficient for currency depreciation for equation (2). The resulting 
coefficients for the different accumulated periods show how strong is the pass-through 
effect in the short and long run. A high estimated coefficient for the depreciation rate 
for the three months accumulated inflation rate case would signal a high short run pass-
through. Figure 4 presents graphically the results for these coefficients for Brazil, 
Chile, and Mexico for different years. These graphs clearly illustrate a decreasing pass-
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through effect for the three countries, especially for Brazil and Chile over the past five 
to ten years22.  
 The results presented in figures 3 and 4 show that the pass-through effect for 
the countries considered here has been decreasing. The historical effect (increasing 
window methodology) of currency depreciation on the inflation rate has been 
decreasing for the three economies considered in this study. The temporary effect 
(rolling window methodology) shows that for the cases of Brazil and Chile the 
estimated coefficient for currency depreciation fell dramatically after both of these 
countries adopted a full-fledged inflation targeting regime in 1999. However, for the 
Mexican economy this coefficient has not shown drastic changes during the time 
period where the economy has been under an IT regime. It changed dramatically in 
1995, when the central bank abandoned the fixed exchange rate, something that is 
intuitively expected, but for the duration of the current IT regime this coefficient has 
only been decreasing slowly.  
Using the results for the estimated coefficients of equation (2), currently from a 
historical perspective (increasing windows) a ten percent twelve month accumulated 
depreciation translates into almost four percentage points of inflation for Brazil, less 
than one percentage point for Chile and almost nine percentage points for Mexico23,24. 
From a temporary perspective (rolling windows) a ten percent twelve month 
accumulated depreciation translates into less than one percentage point of inflation for 
Brazil, less than one percentage point of deflation for Chile and almost three 
percentage points of inflation for Mexico25.   
 
 
 
                                                
22 Once again, the results for the increasing window of Brazil include the data from the hyperinflation 
period that the economy went through in the early nineties. However if the methodology is used for the 
sub-sample of April 1995 through December 2002 the results are different. The estimated coefficients 
for the sub-sample case for Brazil are presented in Table A.1.7 of Appendix 1. 
23 For Brazil’s sub-sample of April 1995 to December 2002. 
24 Note that all coefficients are statistically significant at 95 percent confidence level. 
25 Only the coefficients for Chile and Mexico are statistically significant. 
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Fig. 4. Estimated Coefficients for the Depreciation Rate in Equation (2) for Brazil 
(1993:01 – 2002:12), Chile (1991:01 – 2002:12) and Mexico (1986:01 – 2002:12) with 
a Five Years Initial Window. 
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 In order to extend the empirical findings of this study, following Carstens and 
Werner (1999), the inflationary processes for Brazil, Chile, and Mexico are also 
studied using vector error correction models (VECM) that trace the roots of 
inflationary pressure to currency depreciation, changes in the costs of labor, changes in 
controlled prices, and money creation by the central bank. Carstens and Werner (1999) 
were interested in showing how inflationary pressures had been arising from shocks 
other than monetary ones. They argued that the monetary policy of Banco de Mexico 
had been merely accommodating exogenous shocks to the exchange rate, wages, and 
controlled prices. Here their methodology is employed to show how much of the price 
level (CPI) variation is explained by shocks to the exchange rate, wages, and controlled 
prices. 
The data used for the VECM analyses consists of monthly observations for CPI, 
exchange rate, wages, M1, and inflation of controlled prices (when available) for 
Brazil, Chile, and Mexico26. Standard augmented Dickey-Fuller and Johansen 
cointegration tests were used to justify the use of VECM instead of standard vector 
autoregression estimations (VAR) and to define the cointegrating equations needed for 
each case27. The time periods studied are January 1997 to December 2002 for Brazil 
and Chile and January 1997 to December 2001 for Mexico28. The cointegration tests 
used for each country determined that for Chile and Mexico the VECM should include 
one cointegrating equation, with intercept and no trend, and linear trend in data. For the 
case of Brazil the VECM should include two cointegrating equations, with intercept 
and trend, and linear trend in data. The number of lags was determined using Akaike 
and Schwarz information criteria. The VECM for Chile and Brazil included three lags, 
while only two were included for Mexico. Finally, the ordering of the variables for the 
identification of the shocks was as follows: exchange rate, controlled/administered 
                                                
26 The inflation on controlled prices or administered prices was available for Mexico and Brazil but not 
for Chile. 
27 For every variable used, for each country, the Dickey Fuller tests  (D-F) failed to reject the null 
hypothesis of a unit root for the data in levels. While the D-F tests for the first differenced variables 
rejected the null hypothesis. 
28 Data on wages was only available up until 2001:12 for Mexico. 
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prices, wages, M1, and CPI. This ordering follows the intuitive argument of Carstens 
and Werner (1999). They argue that shocks to exchange rate, public prices (controlled 
or administered prices), and wages should positively affect the price level and M1. The 
impulse response functions, shown in Figures A.1.1 through A.1.3 in Appendix 1, 
show that for the estimated VECMs these effects are generally observed with this 
ordering29. 
 The results obtained from the VECMs for Brazil, Chile, and Mexico can be 
examined as empirical evidence of the pass-through effect from exchange rate 
movements into inflation. Figure 5 presents two graphs. The one on the right showing 
the impulse response functions of CPI for a one standard deviation innovation in the 
exchange rate for the three countries. The one on the left shows the percentage of the 
variation of CPI that is explained by the exchange rate shock. 
Figure 5 shows that the price level in Mexico is more responsive, relative to the 
other two countries, to innovations of the exchange rate. After twelve months, 
approximately thirty percent of the variance of the CPI in Mexico is explained by the 
exchange rate, while for Brazil and Chile respectively only fifteen and less than five 
percent of the CPI variance is explained by the exchange rate30. These numbers suggest 
that the pass-through effect is still relevant in Brazil and Mexico, while in Chile its 
relevancy is very low. 
The four methodologies presented here (autocorrelation, the two simple 
regressions and vector error correction models) support, with different metrics, the 
same result. The pass-through effect and the correlation between inflation and domestic 
currency depreciation have both been decreasing for the three countries included in the 
study. This is more pronounced for Brazil and Chile, two countries that adopted full 
fledged inflation targeting regimes in 1999. Tables I and II summarize the results 
obtained here along with those obtained by previous studies.. The next logical step is to 
identify the reasons for these declines. 
                                                
29 It should be noted that the results are fairly robust to changes in the ordering. 
30 It is important to mention that the ordering used for the identification of the VECM for each country 
does not affect these results, in either magnitude or order.  
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Fig. 5. Impulse Response Function of CPI and Percentage of Variance of CPI 
Explained by the Nominal Exchange Rate (After a One Standard Deviation Innovation 
in the Nominal Exchange Rate). 
  
Table I. Correlation Analysis between Annual Inflation and Depreciation Rates  
Garcia and Restrepo 
(2001) 1986 - 1994 1986 - 1997 1986 - 2000 1990 - 2002 1990 - 1994 1994 - 1998 1996 - 2000 1998 - 2002
0.40 - 0.60 0.60 - 0.80 0.40 - 0.60 na 0.40 - 0.60 (0.60) - (0.80) (0.40) - (0.60) na
Schmidt-Hebbel and 
Werner (2002) 1991 - 1994 1995 - 1998 1999 - 2001 1998 - 2002
0.37 (0.72) (0.39) na
Reyes (2003) 1990 - 1994 1990 - 1997 1990 - 2000 1990 - 2002 1991 - 1994 1995 - 1998 1999 - 2001 1998 - 2002
0.59 0.68 0.30 0.07 n.d. (0.66) (0.40) (0.20)
Schmidt-Hebbel and 
Werner (2002) 1991 - 1994 1995 - 1998 1999 - 2001 1998 - 2002
0.95 1 (0.16) na
Reyes (2003) 1993 - 1994 1993 - 1997 1993 - 2000 1993 - 2002 1991 - 1994 1995 - 1998 1999 - 2001 1998 - 2002
na 0.99* 0.99* 0.99* na 0.99 (0.26) (0.07)
Schmidt-Hebbel and 
Werner (2002) 1991 - 1994 1995 - 1998 1999 - 2001 1998 - 2002
0.28 0.66 0.67 na
Reyes (2003) 1991 - 1994 1991 - 1997 1991 - 2000 1991 - 2002 1991 - 1994 1995 - 1998 1999 - 2001 1998 - 2002
0.84 0.78 0.80 0.81 0.43 0.52 0.58 0.49
Chile
Brazil
Mexico
Rolling WinaowsIncreasing Widows
(long-term) (short-term)
 
Notes:  Numbers in parenthesis represent negative numbers. 
(*) Refers to the calculations from Brazil with the sub-sample that does not include the 
hyperinflation years 
  26 
 
 
 
Table II. Estimated Nominal Exchange Rate Pass-through into Inflation 
Based on Estimated Price Equation Depreciation
Chile 100%
Brazil
Chile
Mexico
Based on Panel Data Regression 
Results Depreciation
10%
10%
Brazil
Chile
Mexico
2002 2000 1998 1996
Depreciation Pass-through Pass-through Pass-through Pass-through
Brazil 10% less than (1.0%) in 12 months 3.0% in 12 months - -
Chile 10% less than (1.0%) in 12 months (2.0%) in 12 months 2.5% in 12 months 4.0% in 12 months
Mexico 10% 3.3% in 12 months 5.0% in 12 months 2.0% in 12 months  1.7% in 12 months
2002 2000 1998 1996
Depreciation Pass-through Pass-through Pass-through Pass-through
Brazil 10% 10% in 12 months 10% in 12 months 10% in 12 months -
Brazil* 10% 3.0% in 12 months 3.4% in 12 months 8.0% in 12 months -
Chile 10% 3.6% in 12 months 5.7% in 12 months 6.5% in 12 months 7.1% in 12 months
Mexico 10% 8.0% in 12 months 8.0% in 12 months 8.0% in 12 months  8.0% in 12 months
2002 2000 1999 1998
Depreciation Pass-through Pass-through Pass-through Pass-through
Brazil (6 months accum.) 10% less than 1.0% less than 1.0% 6.80% 9.50%
Brazil (12 months accum.) 10% less than 1.0% 2.50% 9.50% 9.70%
Chile (6 months accum.) 10% less than (1.0%) less than (1.0%) less than (1.0%) less than 1.0%
Chile (12 months accum.) 10% less than (1.0%) less than (1.0%) 1.30% 2.30%
Mexico (6 months accum.) 10% 2.40% 2.00% 2.30% 2.30%
Mexico (12 months accum.) 10% 3.25% 4.60% 3.50% 3.60%
2002 2000 1999 1998
Depreciation Pass-through Pass-through Pass-through Pass-through
Brazil (6 months accum.) 10% 9.50% 9.50% 9.50% 9.50%
Brazil (12 months accum.) 10% 9.70% 9.70% 9.70% 9.70%
Brazil* (6 months accum.) 10% less than 1.0% less than 1.0% less than 1.0% -
Brazil* (12 months accum.) 10% 3.50% 4.00% 5.40% -
Chile (6 months accum.) 10% less than 1.0% 1.40% 1.80% 2.00%
Chile (12 months accum.) 10% less than 1.0% 1.30% 1.80% 2.10%
Mexico (6 months accum.) 10% 5.40% 5.40% 5.40% 5.30%
Mexico (12 months accum.) 10% 8.50% 8.60% 8.60% 8.70%
relatively high pass through
3.9% after 6 months
9.1% after 12 months
Based on Increasing Windows 
Estimated Coefficients for Equation (2)
Based on Rolling Windows Estimated 
Coefficients for Equaiton (2)
Based on Rolling Windows Estimated 
Coefficients for Equation (1)
Based on Increasing Windows 
Estimated Coefficients for Equation (1)
low pass through
very low pass through
Reyes (2003)
For Emerging Economies (including 
Brazil, Chile and Mexico)
Pass-through
Pass-through
33% after 8 qtrs.
Garcia and Restrepo (2001)
Schmidt-Hebbel and Werner (2002)
Based on Rolling Windows Correlation 
Coefficients
Based on Rolling Windows Correlation 
Coefficients 
Goldfajn and Ribeiro da Costa Werlang (2000)
Currently (1999-2001)
low pass through
very low pass through
relatively high pass through
(1998-2002)
 
Notes: Numbers in parenthesis represent negative numbers. 
(*) Refers to the calculations from Brazil with the sub-sample that does not include the 
hyperinflation years. 
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Garcia and Restrepo (2001) relate lower pass-through levels to negative output 
gaps (output below potential). Their argument is based on the intuitive result that 
negative output gaps tend to offset the inflationary pressure from depreciation by 
reducing margins31. Using data for Chile, Garcia and Restrepo (2001) initially assumed 
a negative output gap of two percent that fades over three years and showed that the 
pass-through effect from exchange rate depreciation is cut almost in half. Without the 
output gap they calculated that a one hundred percent depreciation translates into 
thirty-three percentage points of inflation within eight quarters, while in the presence of 
the negative output gap this number is reduced to almost thirteen percent. 
 Lower pass-through levels have also been related to the credibility of the IT 
regime. Strong credibility is associated with inflation expectations that are not closely 
linked to sudden exchange rate movements because individuals believe that the central 
bank will act effectively in order to counteract any inflationary pressure. The relevant 
issues here are the ways in which the counteraction is implemented. If exchange rate 
movements will translate into inflation pressure, then the policy enacted should be one 
that affects directly or indirectly the exchange rate. If there is no reason to believe that 
the exchange rate movement will affect inflation then there is no need for changes in 
monetary policy. Schmidt-Hebbel and Werner (2002) argue that emerging economies, 
relative to developed ones, are prone to higher pass-through from currency depreciation 
to inflation given their low central bank credibility, high degree of openness, history of 
high inflation, and relevant levels of liability dollarization32. These characteristics 
increase the likelihood and costs of financial crises due primarily to self-fulfilling 
attacks on the assets of these countries and large currency depreciations that cause 
banking failures, bankruptcies, and domestic recessions. Given the possibility of these 
adverse effects and the commitment to IT monetary policy in emerging economies may 
be more responsive to exchange rate movements. 
                                                
31 Mishkin (2001) argues that this is what usually happens when the currency depreciation is the result of 
negative terms of trade shock with negative effects on output. 
32 Liability dollarization refers to the important mismatches between foreign currency assets and 
liabilities of corporate, banking and public sectors. 
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The results of the different analyses presented in this section for Brazil, Chile, 
and Mexico show that these countries have historically high pass-through effects and 
high correlation coefficients between inflation and depreciation. Using the Schmidt-
Hebbel and Werner (2002) argument, recent declines in both statistics may be related 
to actions undertaken by the monetary authorities in order to counteract the effects of 
sudden exchange rate movements. Given the relevant role played by currency 
depreciation in the determination of the CPI, policies enacted may be offsetting the 
initial exchange rate shocks and thus controlling the depreciation rate at a level that is 
consistent with the inflation target. The impulse response functions for the VEC 
analysis included in Appendix 1 show that the nominal exchange rate decreases 
consistently for Brazil and initially for Chile after there is a shock to the price level, 
while for Mexico it initially rises and then falls. This is consistent with the lower 
correlation observed between inflation and depreciation over the last years in these 
countries. In order to link this result to monetary policy responsiveness there should be 
evidence of direct or indirect intervention in the foreign exchange rate market, or in 
other words, evidence for fear of floating in Brazil, Chile, and Mexico. 
 
 
D. Empirical Analysis of Fear Floating33 
 
Central banks can intervene directly in the foreign exchange rate market 
(FOREX) using international reserves to buy/sell foreign currency and therefore 
control effectively the price of foreign currency in terms of domestic currency. There 
can also be an indirect intervention in the FOREX through the manipulation of the 
interest rate, known as an interest rate defense of the currency34. In theory, a country 
implementing IT should have a free floating exchange rate. Therefore, direct or indirect 
interventions in the FOREX would be considered fear of floating practices.  
                                                
33 The exact description and the sources of the data are included in Appendix 1. 
34 Flood and Jeane (2000) and Drazen(1999). 
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Using monthly observations for currency depreciation, interest rate, and 
international reserves for Brazil, Chile, and Mexico it is possible to analyze the 
responsiveness of interest rates and international reserves to exchange rate movements. 
The datasets used are for the time period of January 1997 to December 2002 in which 
Chile and Mexico were moving towards IT and Brazil adopted it with the “big bang” 
approach. 
This analysis is carried out by using vector auto regression (VAR) analysis35. 
The endogenous variables are monthly observations for currency depreciation, 
percentage change of international reserves, and the nominal interest rate36. Two lags 
were included for the three countries.37 The results are presented here using variance 
decomposition graphs of the VARs, but the impulse response functions, shown in 
Figures A.1.4 through A.1.6, are included in Appendix 1. Figure 6 shows the 
percentage of the variance of the interest rate that is explained by the depreciation rate 
after twelve months. This percentage is around nineteen percent for Brazil and Chile 
and sixty five percent in the case of Mexico. Also in Figure 6, the percentage of the 
variance of international reserves explained by innovations of the currency depreciation 
after 12 months is around five percent for Chile and Mexico, and thirteen percent for 
Brazil. These numbers suggest, to a certain extent, that international reserves and 
interest rates are responding to exchange rate movements. Mexico and Chile seem to be 
using more the interest rate, while Brazil utilizes both. By way of comparison, the 
graph also presents the results of this analysis carried out on data from Canada for the 
same time period. With respect to Canada, the Latin American interest rates react more 
to currency depreciation shocks, while international reserves are only more responsive 
for Brazil. 
 
                                                
35 Unit root tests rejected the null hypothesis of a unit root for the variables included in the VARS. 
36 The interest rates used are Tasa de Fondeo for Mexico, Monetary Policy rate for Chile and SELIC rate 
for Brazil. Different reports of the central banks of these countries mention that these are the interest 
rates considered as the representative interest rate for the stance of monetary policy. 
37 Number of lags determined using Akaike and Schwarz information criteria. 
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Percentage of Variance of Interest Rates Explained by 
the  Currency Depreciation
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Fig. 6. Percentage of Interest Rate and International Reserves Variance Explained by 
Domestic Currency Depreciation (After a One Standard Deviation Innovation in 
Currency Depreciation). 
 
 Previous studies of fear of floating have compared the variability of interest 
rates and international reserves for emerging and industrialized economies that claim to 
have a free floating exchange rate38. Table III presents the results of the variability 
analysis that follows the methodology introduced by Calvo and Reinhart (2000). The 
premise behind the analysis is based on the theory of fixed and floating exchange rates. 
Under a fixed or managed nominal exchange rate regime, the variability of the 
exchange rate should be low, while the variability of international reserves and/or 
interest rates, the instruments used to control or manage the regime, should be high. 
For the floating exchange rate regime the opposite results should hold. Calvo and 
Reinhart (2000) present their results by reporting for each country the probability of 
observing monthly percent changes (basis points changes) within a certain range for 
the depreciation rate and the international reserves (for the nominal interest rate). 
 Table III presents the analysis for Brazil, Chile, and Mexico, using data from 
July 1994 to December 2002, January 1996 to December 2002, and January 1989 to 
December 2002, respectively. The samples are divided into two sub-samples. The first 
                                                
38 Reinhart (2000), Reinhart and Calvo (2000) and Schmidt-Hebbel and Werner (2002)  
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one corresponds to the time periods for which these countries implemented managed 
floating exchange rates, while the second corresponds to the IT regime (flexible 
exchange rate)39.  
 
Table III. Variability Analysis of the Nominal Exchange Rate, International Reserves 
and the Nominal Interest Rate 
 
+/- 1.0% +/- 2.5% +/- 1.0% +/- 2.5% 25 basis pts. 50 basis pts. 400 basis pts 500 basis pts.
Brazil (managed float) 81.1 92.4 22.6 49.1 5.6 11.3 39.6 35.8
94:07 - 98:12
Brazil (IT) 8.3 39.5 20.1 43.8 45.9 66.7 12.5 10.4
99:01 - 02:12
Chile (managed float) 70.1 91.2 44.1 64.7 79.4 82.3 0.0 0.0
96:01 - 98:12
Chile (IT) 23.4 63.8 40.4 80.8 69.5 82.9 0.0 0.0
99:01 - 02:12
Mexico (managed float) 63.4 95.8 8.5 28.2 25.4 33.8 9.9 5.7
89:01 - 94:11
Mexico (IT) 26.2 63.9 26.2 65.6 11.5 22.9 8.5 4.9
98:01 - 02:12
Probability that the Monthly Percent Change in Probability that the Monthly Change 
of the Nominal Interest Rate
Falls Within is Higher thanFalls Within
Depreciation International Reserves
 
Notes: The managed float classification follows that of Calvo and Reinhart (2000). 
 
 The results in Table III are interpreted as follows. A lower probability of falling 
within the range of +/- one percent or +/- five percent for the nominal exchange rate or 
international reserves indicates higher variability. For the nominal interest rate, a lower 
probability of falling within the 25 or 50 basis points indicates higher variability, while 
a higher probability of falling outside the 400 – 500 basis point range indicates higher 
variability. 
Table III shows that the variability of the nominal exchange rate is indeed 
higher under IT with respect to the managed floating samples for the three countries 
considered here. For the case of Brazil, the variability of international reserves is very 
similar across regimes, but is slightly higher for the IT regime whereas the interest rate 
                                                
39 Managed floating exchange rates include crawling pegs, bands and exchange rate targets. 
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variability decreased substantially. The data from Chile shows that international 
reserves are slightly less variable under IT whereas the interest rate is slightly more 
variable. Finally, regarding Mexico, the variability of international reserves decreased 
under IT, while the nominal interest rate variability increased. Therefore fear of 
floating could be identified in Chile and Mexico by the higher variability of the interest 
rates under IT, while for Brazil these practices are tied to the higher variability of 
international reserves. 
For a comparison of these results with those observed in developed countries 
implementing IT examine Table A.1.8 in Appendix 1. The variability of reserves in 
Brazil is still slightly higher and the variability of the nominal interest rate is higher for 
Mexico. The results for Chile are similar to those of developed countries implementing 
IT. 
 Schmidt-Hebbel and Werner (2002) is another study that elaborated on fear of 
floating issues. The authors argue that fear of floating practices in emerging economies 
are temporary. That is, these countries respond to exchange rate movements under 
certain circumstances and for limited periods of time. They estimated a Taylor rule 
where the real interest is a function of the inflation gap, output gap, currency 
depreciation, and the foreign interest rate. They used the rolling windows methodology 
and showed that for Brazil, the estimated coefficient for currency depreciation 
increased substantially in 2000-2001, while for Chile and Mexico it increased for the 
time period of 1998 – 1999 in response to market pressures that emerged during and 
after the Asian, Russian, and Brazilian crises of 1997 – 1998. 
 Regarding documented interventions in the FOREX, which can be 
characterized as fear of floating, it should be noted that Brazil openly intervened in the 
FOREX directly in 2001 by selling six billion US dollars during the year40. The central 
bank of Chile publicly announced that in order to reduce nominal exchange rate 
volatility it would sell 1.5 billion US dollars in the FOREX in the middle of 2001 and 
would issue three billion US dollars in dollar-denominated peso Bank debt to provide a 
                                                
40 Monetery Report of 2001, Banco Central do Brasil. 
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hedge against future depreciation41. Mexico’s central bank had in place a formal 
scheme to accumulate reserves during 1996 – 2001, and it also introduced a contingent 
dollar sale mechanism from January 1997 to June 2001, that was enacted when the 
peso depreciated heavily during one day42. The total sales through this scheme were for 
2 billion US dollars43. 
 
 
E. Conclusion 
 
 The results presented here and those of previous studies show that emerging 
economies like Brazil, Chile, and Mexico have had high pass-through effects from 
exchange rate movements into inflation and the inflation and depreciation rates have 
also been highly correlated. Recently these effects have been subsiding, and these 
declines coincide with the time periods in which these countries adopted IT as their 
monetary policy regime. At the same time, in comparison to developed inflation 
targeting countries, Brazil, Chile, and Mexico have shown high levels of direct 
(international reserves) an indirect (interest rate defense) intervention in the foreign 
exchange rate market. In other words, there is evidence of fear of floating practices. 
The next step is to determine whether the lower correlation observed between inflation 
and depreciation and the declining pass-through effects can be the result of fear of 
floating observed under IT. As was mentioned previously, Schmidt-Hebbel and Werner 
(2002) argue that monetary policy may be more responsive to exchange rate 
movements given the central bank’s commitment to IT and the costs associated with 
sudden depreciations. Chapter III presents a theoretical model that is used in Chapter 
IV to  analyze the possible relation between IT and the declines observed in the pass-
through effect and the correlation between inflation and depreciation. The model also 
shows that direct and indirect interventions in the foreign exchange rate market, under 
                                                
41 Monetary Report of 2001, Banco Central de Chile. 
42 Werner (1997) and Werner and Milo (1998) argue that in theory and in practice this mechanism had 
no noticeable effects on the volatility and trend of the exchange rate. 
43 Most of these sales took place in 1998. For more on this contingent scheme see. Werner (1997). 
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certain circumstances, are justified by the commitment to IT. These interventions 
translate into lower correlation between inflation and domestic currency depreciation 
because they break the linear relation between the two variables. The premise behind 
these results is related to the real exchange rate and the relevant role that prices of 
traded goods play in the determination of the overall price level in the economy. 
 The theoretical model analyzes also the effects of fear of floating practices in 
the economy. Secifically trying to see if there are any differences resulting from using 
the interest rate as the policy tool to control the exchange rate pressure on inflation 
instead of international reserves, or are these tools equivalent. Results show that each 
of these policy tools has different effects on the return of foreign assets, the domestic 
interest rate, as well as in production and consumption decisions. These effects result in 
welfare differences that can be ranked in order to make conclusions about which policy 
is preferred. The analysis also compares the results obtained for the IT regime with 
respect to those obtained for a monetary rule regime (Friedman’s rule). The reason for 
this is to compare IT with the alternative regime being suggested to these countries in 
the economic literature44. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                
44 Kumhof (2001). 
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CHAPTER III 
 
 
THE COMPREHENSIVE MODEL FOR INFLATION TARGETING AND A 
MONETARY RULE 
 
 
A. Introduction 
 
 This chapter elaborates on the presentation of the comprehensive model that 
will be used in chapter IV to analyze exchange rate pressure under IT and compare the 
results with those obtained in a framework where the central bank fixes the rate of 
money growth for the nominal money stock (Friedman rule type). Chapter IV also uses 
this model to relate lower pass-through effects to fear of floating practices that under 
certain circumstances are justified by the central bank’s commitment to the inflation 
target. As mentioned in the previous chapter the main feature of the model presented 
here is that it allows the government to use either international reserves or interest rate 
policy as policy instruments to implement IT, as well as allowing for a comparison 
with the rate of money growth rule 
 
B. The Model 
 
The model is a continuous time representative agent model for a small open 
economy, based on Lahiri and Vegh (2001) and Auernheimer and George (2000)45. 
There are two types of goods, traded and non-traded, produced by the private sector. 
Individuals live forever and maximize utility derived from the consumption of both 
                                                
45 I modify Lahiri and Vegh’s model in order to include one traded good and one non-traded good, 
instead of two traded goods. The model is also extended to include the  inflation targeting constraint. 
Inflation Targeting is not discussed in the Lahiri and Vegh (2001) paper, they used the model to analyze 
dirty floating in the context of  nominal wage rigidities. From Auernheimer and George (2000) the 
current model uses their specification for the sluggish non-traded good price and their assumptions for 
the production of the non-traded good. 
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types of goods. The economy can borrow or lend freely in world capital markets. The 
world price of the traded good is taken as given and the law of one price for this good 
is assumed to hold at all times. 
 
1. Consumers  
The representative individual consumes traded and non-traded goods, holds 
domestic deposits, Ht, and foreign bonds. Deposits are held in domestic commercial 
banks and yield the deposits interest rate, dti , while foreign bonds yield the world 
interest rate, rt. The individual’s lifetime utility function is given by: 
 
( ) ( )[ ] dteccU tHtTt∫∞ −−− 



−
≡
0
/11
1
/11
1 βσρρ
σ
 (3) 
 
where Ttc  and 
H
tc  denote traded and non-traded goods consumption, respectively, 
while σ and β represent the inter-temporal elasticity of substitution and the rate of time 
preference. The rate of time preference is assumed to be equal to the world interest 
rate46. Individuals do not hold cash. Instead, they perform transactions with deposits 
and face transaction costs, TCt. 
Let TtP , 
H
tP , 
*T
tP  and Et denote the domestic price level for the traded good, 
domestic price level for the non-traded good, foreign price level of the traded good and 
the nominal exchange rate, respectively. The nominal exchange rate is defined as the 
price of foreign currency in terms of domestic currency and the rate of currency 
depreciation is denoted by ttt EEE /ˆ &= . The real exchange rate is defined as 
H
t
T
t PP /≡ε , and the law of one price for the traded good determines that
T
t
T
tt PPE =
* . 
If TtP  is normalized to one, without loss of generality, the individual’s flow budget 
constraint in terms of the traded good is:  
                                                
46This avoids the problems of ever increasing or decreasing consumption paths. 
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where Ita  represents foreign bond holdings that yield the world interest rate, 
T
tΩ  and 
B
tΩ  are dividends received from commercial banks and firms producing the traded 
good, τt stands for lump sum transfers received from the government, tΠ  is the overall 
inflation rate for the consumption based domestic price index presented below, and Htx  
denotes production of the non-traded good47. 
The last term in equation (4), TCt, denotes the transaction costs incurred by 
individuals. Transaction costs are lower as individuals increase their holdings of real 
deposits. α is a positive constant and ttt PHh /=  denotes real deposits in terms of the 
composite consumption good that yield the interest rate on deposits, dti . Ht denotes the 
nominal stock of deposits in domestic currency and Pt is the consumption based 
domestic price index48 determined by the minimum expenditure required to purchase 
one unit of the composite good, ρρ −1)()( Ht
T
t cc : 
ρρ
ρρ
ρ
ρ
1
)1(
)(
)1(
−
−
−
= H
t
t
t P
EP   (5) 
The problem for the representative individual consists of maximizing (3) 
subject to (4) by choosing optimal values for consumption of traded and non-traded 
goods, deposits and foreign asset holdings while taking as given dti , rt, the level of τt, 
as well as the path for TtΩ  and 
B
tΩ . 
Assuming the following explicit form for the transaction costs technology: 
  καα +−= tttt hhhTC
2),(   ,   ]
2
,0[ α∈th   (6) 
                                                
47 For simplicity the production of the non-traded good is not modeled explicitly, the assumptions about 
the production are explained in detail later in this chapter. 
48 The Price Index, Pt, is the solution to the minimization of the expenditure function 
H
t
H
t
T
t
T
tt cPcPP +=  subject to ( ) ( ) 1cc HtTt =− ρρ 1 . 
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where α and κ are positive constants, the first order conditions for the utility 
maximization problem imply: 
tT
t
H
t
c
c
ερ
ρ
=
−1
  (7) 
 
t
t
d
t
t E
PIh
22
−=
α   (8) 
where dtI  denotes the real deposits spread, 
d
ttt
d
t
m
t iErii −+=− ˆ , which represents the 
opportunity cost of holding real deposits49. 
Equation (7) is the usual condition that equates the marginal rate of substitution 
between consumption of traded and non-traded goods to their relative price. Equation 
(8) shows that real demand deposits are increasing in α  and decreasing in the 
opportunity cost of holding them, dtI . 
 
2. Overall Inflation Rate and Price Sluggishness of the Non-Traded Good (xH) 
The consumption price index derived earlier, equation (5), can be rewritten as 
follows: 
)1(1 )1()( ρρρρ ρρ −−−− −= Httt PEP  (9) 
Taking logs and differentiating with respect to time the overall inflation rate, 
Πt, can be expressed as: 
H
ttt E πρρ )1(ˆ −+=Π   (10) 
I assume that the non-traded good price responds sluggishly, specifically as a 
function of the depreciation rate of domestic currency, tEˆ , and the difference between 
the current and the steady state equilibrium of the real exchange rate: 
      *)(ˆ εεγπ −+= ttHt E  (11) 
                                                
49The transaction cost function, equation (4), considers only positive transaction costs, as it is standard in 
the literature. 
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where ε* represents the steady state equilibrium level for the real exchange rate50. 
Equation (11) implies that the real exchange rate will adjust according to51: 
     )*(ˆ tt εεγε −=   (12) 
 
Using equations (10) and (11), the overall inflation rate is: 
*))(1(ˆ εεργ −−+=Π ttt E  (13) 
Equation (13) implies that exchange rate movements translate into inflationary 
pressure due to the sluggish adjustment of the non-traded good price level. These 
exchange rate movements can be in response to exogenous shocks like changes in the 
world interest rate, rt, or money demand shocks that cause a reallocation of assets. 
Inflationary pressure arises from the catching up effect of the non-traded good price 
level. These effects continue until the real exchange rate is back to its steady state 
equilibrium, ε*.  
 
3. Production of the Non-Traded Good 
Instead of explicitly modeling firms producing the non-traded good, Htx , I have 
assumed that there is a constant exogenous level for the long run production level net 
of government purchases, *Hx , equal to the consumption level of this good that 
corresponds to the steady state equilibrium level for the real exchange rate, ε*. In the 
short run, production will completely adjust to the level of consumption. The long run 
real exchange rate can be derived from equation (7) after taking into account the 
market clearing condition, 
T
t
H
t c
x **
1 ρ
ρ
ε
−
=  (14) 
                                                
50The inflation rate of the non-traded good is a function of the expected depreciation rate, atEˆ , but I am 
assuming  perfect foresight, so tat EE ˆˆ = . The sluggish response of the non-traded good mirrors the 
resulting price stickiness that would be obtained with the forward-looking sticky price model of non-
traded goods by Calvo(1983) and the modified version of this framework presented in Kumhof (2000). 
51 Recall that Ht
T
tt PP /=ε  and that that the law of one price for the traded good determines that 
T
tt PE = , therefore 
H
ttt E πε −= ˆˆ . 
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Equation (14) implies that for given levels of consumption of the traded good 
and the real exchange rate, at every point in time, production of the non-traded good 
will be determined by the level of  consumption of that good. In other words, the non-
traded good market will always clear, Ht
H
t cx = . Eventually production will adjust the 
long run level as the real exchange rate moves towards its steady state equilibrium. 
 
4. Production of the Traded Good (xT) 
 Firms producing the traded good have a production technology that uses an 
imported input, Kt, as its sole input. Firms have the following production function: 
 
   θ][ t
T
t Kx =    0 < θ < 1 (15) 
 
They also face a credit-in-advance constraint to pay for the imported input, in 
other words they use bank loans denominated in domestic currency to pay for their 
working capital:52,53 
    tt Kn ψ≥  ,    ψ > 0  (16) 
 
where ttt ENn /=  denotes loans, in terms of the traded good, from commercial banks 
and the equality holds whenever there is a positive cost for loans, i.e. 0>=− Lt
m
t
L
t Iii . 
Firms producing the traded good hold foreign bonds, Tta , that yield the world interest 
rate, rt. These firms have real financial wealth defined by the difference between their 
foreign bond holdings and the loans that they acquire from commercial banks, 
t
T
t
T
t naq −= . 
                                                
52 This assumption, as in Lahiri and Vegh (2001), introduces a credit channel into the model by 
introducing a demand for bank loans. 
53 These loans are revolving loans, meaning that firms do not accumulate debt. The firms first get the 
loan with which they acquire the input needed for the production of the current period, then they sell the 
good and repay the loan immediately. 
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 From (15) and (16) and imposing the standard transversality condition, the 
firm’s profit maximizing problem reduces to : 
 
( )[ ] dtIKKqdtMax LtttTTtK ∫ ∫
∞ ∞
+−+=Ω
0 0
0 1 ψθ  (17)  
 
The first order condition for the profit maximization problem results in the 
following demand function for the imported input: 
θ
ψ
θ −


+
=
1
1
1 Lt
t I
K  (18) 
  
Equation (18) shows that the demand for the imported input is decreasing in the 
loans spread, LtI , and it determines implicitly the demand for commercial banks loans. 
 
5. The Banking Sector 
 The representative bank extends loans, nt to the firms producing the traded 
good, charging them the interest rate on loans, Lti , holds government bonds, 
ttt EZz /= , that pay interest rate, 
G
ti , accepts deposits from consumers paying them an 
interest rate of dti , and holds required reserves for these deposits, 
tttttt hPHmPM δδ =≥= // . The banking sector is assumed to be perfectly 
competitive54. This implies that the banks balance sheet in terms of the traded good is 
equal to )/()/( tttttttt EPhznEPm =++ , and the profit maximization problem for the 
representative bank is the following:  
 
t
tm
tt
G
tt
L
t
t
t
t
d
t
B
tznh E
PmizInI
E
PhIMax −++=Ω
,,
 (19) 
 
                                                
54 The modeling of the banking sector follows Lahiri and Vegh (2000) and Lahiri and Vegh (2001) 
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where GtI  is the government interest rate spread, 
m
t
G
t ii − . Noting that δ is set 
exogenously by the monetary authority, commercial banks receive no interest payment 
on their reserve holdings other than the return on real money balances meaning that 
banks will not hold excess reserves. Then using the banks’ balance sheet, the first order 
conditions for the maximization problem are:  
 
( )( ) ( ) mtdtmtmtLt iiiii δδ =−+−−1  (20) 
 
( ) ( )mtGtmtLt iiii −=−  (21) 
 
Equation (20) is the standard result where banks equalize the marginal revenue 
and the marginal cost of an additional unit of deposits. The marginal revenue depends 
on the deposit spread and the loans spread that they get when they lend a fraction, 1-δ, 
of the additional unit of deposits. Using equation (21) it is easy to notice that the 
interest rate on loans must be equal to the interest rate obtained from government 
bonds. This is the condition for an interior solution. Intuitively this is the result of 
perfect substitution between government bonds and commercial loans from the 
viewpoint of commercial banks. From equation (20) the resulting expression shows 
that at every point in time the interest rate on deposits is determined by the interest rate 
paid by government bonds, Gt
d
t ii )1( δ−= , giving effective interest rate control to the 
government55. 
In order to ensure a determinate demand for deposits and loans, the following 
restriction for the interest rate is imposed in the model, Gt
m
t
G
t iii δ≤−≤0 . Assuming 
non-negative loan and deposit spreads derives the condition. It is worthwhile to note 
that there is an implicit relationship between the demand for deposits in commercial 
                                                
55 This is based on the well-known setup introduced by Calvo and Vegh (1995), where the government 
issues interest-bearing money. In this case the government issues bonds, but the interest for government 
bonds affects directly the interest rate on the liquid asset of the economy (real deposits) through the 
banking system. 
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banks and money demand, which is determined by the reserve requirements that banks 
must hold. 
 
6. Government 
For this setup the government is comprised of the fiscal authority and the 
central bank. The first one issues government bonds, paying the government interest 
rate, Gti , consumes the non-traded good, 
H
tG , and makes lump-sum transfers, τt, to the 
public. The Central Bank sets δ, issues domestic currency, Mt, and holds international 
reserves, Rt, that pay the world interest rate, rt. The flow budget constraint for the 
government in terms of the traded good is: 
t
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The central bank’s balance sheet identity is given by: 
 
tttt MDRE =+    ,  t
G
tt ZDD −=  (23) 
where Dt denotes the net nominal domestic credit that results from subtracting nominal 
government bonds, Zt, from gross nominal domestic credit, GtD
56. 
Moving away from fiscal implications, from (22), the lump sum transfers to the 
consumers consist of seigniorage revenue from issuing cash and bonds and the interest 
earned on international foreign holdings by the government. A final standard 
assumption is made by setting the rate of accumulation of international reserves equal 
to zero in steady state, 0=tR& . This assumption doesn’t mean that the government can’t 
intervene in the foreign exchange market, but rather that it can only embark on discrete 
interventions by increasing or decreasing the level of international reserves 
 
7. The Aggregate Budget Constraint 
                                                
56 Net nominal domestic credit, tD , represents government debt with the central bank. Government 
bonds work in a way that is very similar to bank loans. They are revolving loans to the government. 
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The aggregate budget constraint is derived from summing up the budget 
constraints of consumers, firms, banks and the government. The resulting aggregate 
constraint is 
][ 2 κα
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where Wt represents total level of net foreign assets, Tt
I
tt aaR ++ . Recalling that the 
equilibrium condition in the market for the non-traded good holds at all times and 
noting that consumption of the traded good adjusts to the level that satisfies the 
condition 0=tW& , then for a level of total net foreign assets given by past history, oW , 
the equilibrium level of traded good consumption is determined by: 
 
][ 20 κα +−−−+= ttt
T
tt
T
t hhKxrWc  (25) 
 
C. Characterizing the Equilibrium 
 
 I am interested in comparing three different monetary policy regimes. The first 
is the standard monetary rule regime, where the central bank fixes the rate of growth of 
the nominal money stocks. The other two regimes are both IT regimes, but they differe 
in the policy instrument used to comply with the inflation target. Recall that here the 
instrument will be used to fight off inflation pressure coming from exchange rate 
movements which means that the instrument will affect directly or indirectly the level 
of the nominal exchange rate. The first IT regime uses direct intervention of the central 
bank in the foreign exchange market, using international reserves. The second one uses 
interest rate policy to indirectly affect the level of the nominal exchange rate. 
For the monetary rule, given that banks have reserve requirements on the 
deposits they received, it can be stated that tttttt hPHmPM δδ =≥= //  and the 
evolution of real money in the economy is given by 
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where µt is the rate of money growth and Πt is the overall inflation rate. Combining 
equations (13) and (26) and using (8) to substitute for Eˆ  results in  
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 After linearizing equations (27) and (12) the system can be represented in a 
phase diagram. There is a unique non-trivial steady state, which is a saddle and 
therefore dynamic equilibria are determined with no fluctuations observed57. Figure 
(7), shows this diagram. When the central bank is implementing a monetary rule it 
fixes the rate of money growth, µt, and the diagram depicted in figure (7) can be used 
to analyze the equilibrium paths that the system follows as it returns to the steady state. 
Consumption for the traded good is determined by equation (25), given the levels for 
the real exchange rate, real demand deposits, and the level of net foreign assets 
determined by past history (W0). This by equation (14), also determines non-traded 
good production and consumption.  
 
 
                                                
57 It is important to note that both variables in the phase diagram are control variables, but after 
introducing a shock to the system, there exist only one ε that puts the system on the saddle path.  
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Fig. 7. Phase Diagram of the Comprehensive Model. 
  
In the case where the monetary authority is implementing IT, the central bank 
sets the overall inflation target, Π. When the economy is not at steady state, the central 
bank will control the level of the nominal exchange rate by directly intervening in the 
foreign exchange market or by using an interest rate policy. The objective of the central 
bank is to keep the depreciation rate of domestic currency at a rate that is consistent 
with overall inflation. By doing so it looses control over the money supply which will 
be endogenously determined as is the case with a standard fixed exchange rate regime. 
Under this framework equation (8) establishes the relationship that holds at all times 
between the demand for real deposits and the real exchange rate. When the system 
returns to the steady state, the levels of consumption, production and real deposits held 
by individuals will be the same as in the case of the monetary rule if the inflation target 
and the target rate of growth set for the nominal money stock are the same. The use of 
the interest rate and international reserves to control the nominal exchange rate is 
classified as fear of floating. But these fear of floating practices are justified since they 
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reflect the response of monetary policy to inflationary pressure arising from exchange 
rate movements.  
 
D.  Inflation Targeting Policy Instruments 
 
 When the central bank follows a monetary rule, the rate of depreciation, tEˆ , is 
endogenously determined and the monetary authorities do not react to exogenous 
shocks that affect the economy. Under IT, the central bank has two different 
instruments to influence the nominal exchange rate in order to keep it at or move it to a 
level that is consistent with the inflation target. This can be seen by rewriting the 
central bank’s balance sheet, equation (23), as follows: 
    
t
t
t
t
tt R
P
P
D
mE 



−=  (28) 
Equation (28) shows that given a level of international reserves, Rt, the 
monetary authorities can use the interest rate, dti , to modify the level of Et, since 
changes in  the interest rate influence directly tm  given the relationship that exists 
between real money holdings and real deposits. The central bank could also, given tm , 
intervene directly in the foreign exchange market using international reserves, and 
hence change the level of Et. 
Given the differences between the monetary rule and IT, different types of 
shocks can be introduced to the system and the resulting adjustment processes for the 
system under each regime can be analyzed. This is just the comparison of one regime 
against the other. But the model also allows for another comparison depending on 
which instrument is used to implement the IT scheme.  
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CHAPTER IV 
 
INFLATION TARGETING, MONETARY RULE AND PASS-THROUGH EFFECT 
ANALYSIS USING THE COMPREHENSIVE MODEL 
 
 
A. Introduction 
 
The first section of this chapter uses the comprehensive model to analyze the 
outcomes of two types of shocks, world interest rate and money demand shocks. It 
compares the results obtained under the monetary rule against those from the two IT 
regimes and discusses the differences that exist between IT with international reserves 
and IT with interest rate policy. The second section shows that direct and indirect 
interventions under IT result in lower correlation coefficients between currency 
depreciation and inflation as well as in lower pass-through effects from the nominal 
exchange rate movements into inflation.  
 
B. World Interest Rate (rt) Shock 
 
 Equation (27) shows that shocks to the world interest rate change the steady 
state equilibrium for the comprehensive model. Intuitively the world interest rate is 
directly related to the opportunity cost of holding real deposits, that is, a higher world 
interest rate increases this opportunity cost. Therefore these shocks will also affect the 
nominal exchange rate as individuals reallocate their assets in response to changes in rt. 
These effects are the same for the three regimes considered here, IT with international 
reserves, IT with interest rate, and a monetary rule. Consequently the steady state is the 
same for all of these regimes. 
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1. Under a Monetary Rule Case 
This section describes the adjustment process that the variables follow under a 
monetary rule after a once and for all increase in the world interest rate, rt. Figure 8 
illustrates the effects of the change in rt. First of all the 0/ =tt hh&  line shifts to the left, 
while the 0/ =tt εε&  line is unaffected. The diagram shows the saddle path that 
corresponds to the new equilibrium for real deposits. The adjustment process takes 
place as follows. The demand for real deposits is determined by Equation (8). A 
change in the world interest rate will increase the opportunity cost of holding real 
deposits, dtI . There will be an immediate jump of the nominal exchange rate given the 
individuals undesired excess level of real deposits. This jump will be such that the 
unique real exchange rate that puts the system on the new saddle path is obtained. 
Thereafter the system will follow the saddle path moving toward the new steady state 
level for real deposits. 
h
ε
A
B
C
ε∗
dh0 /dt=0
dh1 /dt=0
h0*h1*
c
dε/dt=0
 
Fig. 8. Representation of an Increase in the World Interest Rate. 
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The adjustment paths for the different variables in the system are depicted in 
Figure 9 and the parameters used in the simulation are presented in Table A.2.I, 
included in the Appendix 2. The graphs corresponding to the consumption levels of the 
traded and non-traded goods show that these will be higher than their new steady state 
level for the duration of the adjustment period. This result follows from the higher 
interest returns that individuals receive for their holdings of foreign assets and because, 
for a period of time, production of the traded good exceeds its new steady state 
equilibrium level given that the opportunity cost of loans, LtI , drops initially and 
adjusts slowly towards its new steady state. Another source of the higher consumption 
levels is that even though transaction costs rise immediately after the change in rt, they 
do not reach their steady state level, they will also be lower for a period of time. Finally 
the sluggish adjustment of the home good price will result in a higher overall inflation 
rate throughout the adjustment process. Once the real exchange rate returns to the 
steady state level, the overall inflation rate will be equal to the unchanged rate of 
monetary growth set by the central bank. 
 
2. Under Inflation Targeting 
Before discussing the IT regimes it is important to notice that the government 
does not need to intervene to avoid the initial jump of the nominal exchange rate. This 
is a once and for all jump and therefore it would not affect overall inflation rate if 
prices were perfectly flexible. The problem comes from the sluggishness of the non-
traded good price. After the jump of the nominal exchange rate, the non-traded good 
inflation rate will be affected by the catching up effect that comes from the inequality 
between the steady state and current real exchange rate. Given this inflation pressure, 
the monetary authority will be forced to intervene in the foreign exchange market. The 
central bank will set a depreciation rate or a path for the nominal exchange rate that 
will be consistent with the overall inflation target.  
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Traded Good Consumption
1 11 21 31 41 51 61 71 81 91 101
Monetary Rule Reserves
Home Good Consumption
1 11 21 31 41 51 61 71 81 91 101
Monetary Rule Reserves
Traded Good Production
1 11 21 31 41 51 61 71 81 91 101
Monetary Rule Reserves
Interest Spread on Loans
1 11 21 31 41 51 61 71 81 91 101
Monetary Rule Reserves
Domestic Currency Depreciation
1 11 21 31 41 51 61 71 81 91 101
Monetary Rule Reserves
Home Good Inflation
1 11 21 31 41 51 61 71 81 91 101
Monetary Rule Reserves
Difference in the Real Exchange Rate for Monetary Rule Vs. 
IT
1 21 41 61 81 101 121 141 161 181 201 221 241 261 281
0
Real Demand Deposits
1 11 21 31 41 51 61 71 81 91 101
Monetary Rule Reserves
 
Fig. 9. An Increase in the World Interest Rate: Results for the Monetary Rule and the 
Inflation Targeting Regime with International Reserves. 
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In other words, the difference between the current and the steady state level of 
real exchange rate will force the central bank to set a lower depreciation rate, tEˆ , for 
the domestic currency. The sum of this rate and non-traded good inflation must equal 
to the overall inflation target. 
 
2.A. With International Reserves 
First consider the case where the central bank uses international reserves to 
influence the nominal exchange rate and satisfy the overall inflation target after there 
has been an increase in the world interest rate. In this case, as was mentioned before, 
Equatioen (8) determines the relationship between real demand deposits and the real 
exchange rate that holds at all times. The central bank adjusts its level of international 
reserves according to the real money demand, determined by the relation of reserve 
requirements and real deposits, the real exchange rate level and the depreciation rate 
consistent with the overall inflation target. 
The depreciation rate that is consistent with the inflation target will be lower 
than the depreciation rate that was observed when the central bank was implementing a 
monetary rule. Figure 9 shows this and the other paths for the variables in the system 
for IT with international reserves and for the monetary rule case. The lower 
depreciation rate, with respect to the one observed under a monetary rule, causes two 
different effects, a positive (benefit) and a negative one (cost). Together these 
ultimately result in lower levels of consumption for traded and non-traded goods, 
relative to those observed under the monetary regime. The negative one comes from 
the effect that the rate of depreciation has on the opportunity cost of loans. In contrast 
to the monetary rule case, the interest spread on loans still drops after the change in rt 
but it stays above the new steady state level throughout the adjustment period. This 
causes a lower level of production of the traded good relative to that observed under 
the monetary rule case. The positive effect comes from the level of real deposits which 
will be higher throughout the adjustment period, relative to the monetary rule result, 
since the opportunity cost of holding them in this case is lower. Therefore transaction 
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costs are lower under the IT regime with international reserves. These two effects enter 
equation (25) and determine that consumption for the traded good and therefore 
production and consumption of the non-traded good as well are lower under the 
inflation targeting regime that uses reserves as the instrument to control the exchange 
rate. This follows from the fact that the negative effect on production of the traded 
good (cost) dominates the positive effect from lower transaction costs (benefit). 
 
2.B. With Interest Rate Policy 
Now consider the case where the central bank uses interest rate policy to 
influence the nominal exchange rate and satisfy the overall inflation target. In this case 
the monetary authorities will try to induce a demand for real deposits that is consistent 
with the exchange rate path and the inflation target. To do so they will use the interest 
rate on domestic government bonds, gti . Recall that these bonds are held by 
commercial banks and using equations (20) and (21) this policy directly affects the 
interest rate on real deposits. Again, there is a positive effect (benefit) reflected in 
lower transaction costs and a negative effect (cost) reflected in lower production levels 
for the traded good that will end up causing a lower consumption level of traded and 
home goods through out the adjustment process, relative to the one observed under the 
monetary rule. The transmission channels again are the lending spread and the 
opportunity cost of holding real demand deposits. The difference with respect to IT 
with international reserves is that these are now affected in two ways. The first is due 
to the lower depreciation rate, relative to the one observed under the monetary rule 
regime. And the second due to the effects that the changes in gti  will have on 
d
tI  and 
L
tI . Figure 10, shows the paths that the variables of the system follow under an IT 
regime with interest rate policy, IT with direct intervention in the foreign exchange 
market (via international reserves) and under the monetary rule regime. Under IT, for 
both cases, the central bank is trying to force a lower rate of depreciation for the 
domestic currency, which under an IT  regime  that  uses interest   rate policy translates  
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Traded Good Consumption
1 11 21 31 41 51 61 71 81 91 101
Monetary Rule Reserves Id
Home Good Consumption
1 11 21 31 41 51 61 71 81 91 101
Monetary Rule Reserves Id
Traded Good Production
1 11 21 31 41 51 61 71 81 91 101
Monetary Rule Reserves Id
Transaction Costs
1 11 21 31 41 51 61 71 81 91 101
Monetary Rule Reserves Id
Interest Spread on Loans
1 11 21 31 41 51 61 71 81 91 101
Monetary Rule Reserves Id
Interest Rate on Loans
1 11 21 31 41 51 61 71 81 91 101
Monetary Rule Reserves Id
Interest Srpread on Deposits
1 11 21 31 41 51 61 71 81 91 101
Monetary Rule Reserves Id
c
Real Demand Deposits
1 11 21 31 41 51 61 71 81 91 101
Monetary Rule Reserves Id
Fig. 10. An Increase in the World Interest Rate: Results for the Monetary Rule, the 
Inflation Targeting Regime with International Reserves, and the Inflation Targeting 
Regime with Interest Rate Policy. 
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into a higher gti  throughout the adjustment process and until the new steady state is 
reached.  
The higher interest rate on government bonds will increase the interest rate 
spread on loans and will lower the opportunity cost on holding real demand deposits, 
relative to the IT case with international reserves. This situation will be reflected in 
lower levels of production for the traded good and higher real deposits holdings. These 
effects, just as in the IT with international reserves case, enter in the equation that 
determines the level of consumption for the traded good and therefore the level of 
production and consumption of the home good. The result is a lower level of 
consumption than under the IT regime with international reserves and the monetary 
rule regime. The result implies that the positive effect that the policy has on transaction 
costs, due to higher holdings of real deposits, is again overwhelmed by the negative 
effects that it has on the production of the home goods. 
 
 
C. Money Demand Shock 
 
 In the comprehensive model presented in Chapter III there is a relationship 
between real money holdings and real deposits determined by the reserve requirements 
that commercial banks hold on deposits they received, tt mh =⋅δ . Following Equation 
(8) from chapter III, different values of α change the demand for real deposits. Then 
changes in the parameter α in the transaction cost function can be interpreted as money 
demand shocks in the model. An increase in α corresponds to positive demand shock, 
while a decrease corresponds to a negative shock. Intuitively positive shocks to α 
lower the marginal cost of holding real deposits but the marginal benefit, dti , remains 
unaffected. Given this inequality, individuals will increase their real deposit holdings 
until the equalization is attained once more, situation that happens in the new steady 
state. Once again these effects are the same across the three regimes considered here. 
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1. Under a Monetary Rule  
 The shock analyzed here is that of an unexpected once and for all increase in α. 
Figure 11 shows the corresponding phase diagram that shows the effects of the change 
in α. In this case the 0hh tt =/& line shifts to the right and the new steady state 
corresponds to a higher level of real deposits. The change in α causes a reallocation of 
assets by the individuals moving out of foreign assets into domestic assets. Higher 
holdings of real deposits will translate into lower transaction costs that will ultimately 
allow higher levels of consumption of both goods. Since the nominal exchange rate is 
flexible, there will be an immediate decrease in the price of foreign currency in terms 
of domestic currency such that the real exchange rate that puts the system on the saddle 
path is attained. Once on the saddle path, lower rates of currency depreciation, non-
traded good inflation, and overall inflation prevail throughout the adjustment process. 
 
h
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dh0 /dt=0
h0* h1*
dε/dt=0
 
Fig. 11. Representation of a Positive Money Demand Shock. 
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Figure 12 shows the resulting paths followed by the different variables in the 
system. Production of the traded good, after an initial drop, returns to its steady state 
value as does the opportunity cost of commercial loans. Opportunity cost of 
commercial loans increases initially because of the lower rates of depreciation. The 
steady state corresponds to a higher level of real deposits holdings that result in lower 
transaction costs and higher levels of consumption. 
 
2. Under Inflation Targeting 
Following the argument presented in section 2.A above, the government does 
not need to intervene to avoid the initial decrease of the nominal exchange rate. This is 
a once an for all change that does not affect the overall inflation rate. After α 
decreases, the same situation that occurs under a monetary rule regarding the 
reallocation of assets is present for this case. There will be an initial decrease of the 
nominal exchange rate and an initial fall of the real exchange rate. Given the price 
sluggishness of the non-traded good the catching up effect is characterized by a lower 
inflation rate for this type of good throughout the transition. This situation forces the 
central bank to establish a path for the nominal exchange rate that results in higher 
rates of depreciation, with respect to the monetary rule, in order to comply with the 
inflation target. Just as in the case of the shock to the world interest rate, the steady 
state for the system under IT is the same as the steady state for the monetary rule.  
 
2.A. With International Reserves 
As in the case of a change in the world interest rate presented in section 1.A., 
Equation (6) determines the relationship between real deposits and the real exchange 
rate that holds at all times. Taking this relation into account, after the increase in α the 
central bank will adjust the level of international reserves according to the level needed 
to maintain the nominal exchange rate at a level consistent with the inflation target. 
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Fig. 12. A Positive Money Demand Shock: Results for the Monetary Rule and the 
Inflation Targeting Regime with International Reserves. 
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The result of these actions, with respect to those observed under a monetary 
rule, is a higher level of production of the traded good (since the opportunity cost of 
commercial loans is lower) and higher transaction costs (since the opportunity cost of 
holding real deposits is higher) throughout the transition. 
Figure 12 shows the adjustment paths that the different variables of the system 
follow as they approach steady state. When the results of IT and the monetary rule 
regime are compared, the higher transaction costs observed under IT offset the higher 
production of the traded good. In other words the costs introduced by the IT 
commitment offset the benefits. This situation results in lower levels of consumption 
for IT with respect to the monetary rule. 
 
2.B. With Interest Rate Policy 
 When the interest rate is used to influence the depreciation rate of domestic 
currency in order to comply with the inflation target, important differences arise 
between IT with interest rates, IT with international reserves and the monetary rule 
regime. After the initial drop of the nominal exchange rate, due to the increase in α, the 
monetary authority will decrease the interest rates on government bonds which in turn, 
by Equations (20) and (21), will affect the interest rate on real deposits. The reduction 
of the government bond interest rate is such that the level of real money holdings 
satisfies Equation (28), taking as given the level of international reserves and the 
determined path for the nominal exchange rate that is consistent with the inflation 
target. 
 When the central bank uses the interest rate as the policy tool to comply with 
the inflation target it introduces additional differences to the opportunity costs of 
commercial loans and holdings of real deposits, with respect to the two alternative 
regimes discussed before. Throughout the adjustment process the opportunity cost of 
holding real deposits is higher since in this case the interest rate on government bonds 
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is lowered, while the opportunity cost on commercial loans decreases for the same 
reason. 
 Figure 13 presents the adjustment paths for the variables in the system. When 
the results of IT with interest rate policy are compared to those obtained for the cases 
of IT with international reserves and the monetary rule it is possible to observe that the 
differences caused by the different opportunity costs. Throughout the adjustment 
process, higher opportunity costs of holding real deposits will result in lower levels for 
these and therefore higher transaction costs. These transaction costs are higher than 
those observed for the monetary rule and even higher than the resulting ones from the 
IT with international reserves regime. The results for the traded good are exactly the 
opposite, throughout the transition the opportunity cost of commercial loans is lower 
and therefore production of the traded good is the highest level with respect to the other 
two regimes. The higher transaction costs and the higher production of the traded good 
can be interpreted as costs and benefits, respectively, of the IT regime. Once again the 
costs offset the benefits and the consumption levels for IT with international reserves 
are the lowest of the three regimes.  
 
D. Summarizing the Results and Welfare Analysis 
 
Looking at figures (9), (10), (12) and (13) is easy to visualize that the worst 
results for consumption and production are the ones that result from the case where the 
monetary authorities implement IT using the interest rate on government bonds as the 
instrument variable. The highest levels of production and consumption are achieved 
when the central bank follows a monetary rule. In order to formalize these conclusions, 
some elaboration on welfare comparisons for these regimes is needed. 
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Fig. 13. A Positive Money Demand Shock: Results for the Monetary Rule, the Inflation 
Targeting Regime with International Reserves and the Inflation Targeting Regime with 
Interest Rate Policy. 
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First notice that the steady state equilibrium is the same for the three regimes. 
The difference in welfare comes from the adjustment period after the shock occurs, that 
is, after the change in the world interest rate or a money demand shock. To measure 
welfare I use the utility function for the individuals, which depends on consumption of 
traded and home goods. I calculate the sum of the present value for the utility levels 
from the period when the shock occurs onward. These welfare calculations for the case 
of an increase in the world interest rate show that  
 
             U Mon. Rule    >  U IT Reserves  >  U IT interest rate policy 
                   (1.97)                    (1.96)                        (1.94) 
while for the money demand shock, decrease in α, show that  
 
             U Mon. Rule    >  U IT Reserves  >  U IT interest rate policy 
                   (1.47)                    (1.45)                        (1.42) 
 
These results would lead to a misleading conclusion, recommending the 
dismissal of IT in favor of the monetary rule. But it is important to keep in mind that 
the results presented here are for an increase in the world interest rate and a positive 
money demand shock. The results would be the complete opposite if the current 
analysis were to be replicated for a fall in the world interest rate and a negative money 
demand shock.  
These results indicate that the answers for both questions about which regime is 
better, IT or a monetary rule, and which IT regime is better, IT with reserves or IT with 
interest rates, depend on the direction of the shock that is being analyzed. But even 
though the answers are shock dependent, a recommendation can still be extracted from 
this analysis: if emerging economies decide to use IT as their monetary policy regime, 
the optimal policy for the central bank, based on welfare, is to use international 
reserves to maintain the inflation target when there is an increase in the world interest 
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rate or a positive money demand shock, and interest rate policy should be used when 
the opposite shocks take place. 
One more thing to notice is that after the world interest rate increases or there is 
a money demand shock the central bank that is implementing either IT regime, will be 
forced to influence directly or indirectly the nominal exchange rate in order to comply 
with the inflation target. This behavior is something that should be expected in 
emerging economies with IT regimes in place and should be differentiated from the 
standard fear of floating since it is justified by the IT mandate to comply with a 
specific inflation target. 
 
E. Comment on the Parameters of the Model 
 
The results discussed above are robust to different combinations of all the 
parameters. But there is one parameter that affects the conclusions. This parameter is θ, 
the parameter of the production function for the traded good. The magnitude of this 
parameter changes the conclusions at some extent. The simulations discussed use a 
high value for θ, which translates into high costs for the direct or indirect intervention 
under the IT regimes. These costs being reflected in lower production levels of the 
traded good due to the higher lending spreads (opportunity costs of commercial loans) 
that firms face when the monetary authority implements IT instead of a monetary rule 
when there is an increase in the world interest rate or a positive money demand shock. 
When θ is low enough, the benefits from lower transaction costs under IT, relative to 
the ones under the monetary rule regime, overwhelm the costs of the intervention and 
therefore consumption and welfare would be higher for the case where IT is used 
instead of the monetary rule, and interest rate policy would be the preferred instrument 
for IT. I have used a high value for θ for my simulations because for emerging 
economies it is realistic to assume that changes in the interest rate on loans have strong 
effects in production, while for developed countries these effects could be lower due to 
greater hedging possibilities available in these countries. 
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F. Correlation between Inflation and Domestic Currency Depreciation, Pass-Through 
Effect and Fear of Floating under Inflation Targeting 
 
 The previous section showed that under certain circumstances central banks 
implementing IT will intervene directly or indirectly in the foreign exchange rate 
market in order to comply with the inflation target. The empirical results of Chapter II 
showed that when Brazil, Chile and Mexico had some sort of managed floating 
exchange rate the correlation between inflation and depreciation rates was high and this 
correlation decreased as they moved towards the implementation of a full fledged IT 
regime. The comprehensive model setup for the overall inflation rate can be used to 
replicate the correlation analysis of Chapter II and show that the decrease in correlation 
after the adoption of IT can be related to the direct or indirect interventions in the 
foreign exchange rate market. In other words, lower correlation coefficients can be 
related to fear of floating observed under IT. 
 
1. The Framework for the Analysis 
 The IT regime presented in Chapter III was for a strict inflation target, therefore 
the central bank was committed to achieving the point target for the inflation rate at 
every point in time. In that case the variance of the inflation rate is zero and it is not 
possible to perform a correlation analysis between the depreciation rate of domestic 
currency and the overall inflation rate. In order to circumvent this problem, a gradual 
inflation targeting scheme is introduced into the comprehensive model in order to 
allow small fluctuations of the overall inflation rate under IT58. In reality countries that 
announce point targets are not expected to meet them exactly but the realized rate 
should not be consistently above or below the target and a clear trend towards the point 
target should persist. The analysis shown here will use the same parameters as those 
                                                
58 The results presented in the previous section are unaffected when the analysis is carried out with the 
gradual IT rule as long as the gradual rule does not translate into major differences between the point 
target and the gradual target. For the parameters chosen and the shocks considered the difference 
between the point target and the gradual target should not be higher than +/-0.50 percentage points. If 
higher shocks, in magnitude, are introduced this difference can be increased. 
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used in the previous section, but the overall inflation rate is not forced to be exactly 
equal to the point target. I assume that the central bank will use the following ad-hoc 
adjustment rule and that individuals are aware of this rule. For the cases where 
inflationary pressure arises from a sudden increase of the nominal exchange rate in 
response to an increase in the world interest rate or a negative money demand shock, 
the overall inflation rate will be allowed to be above the target for a certain period of 
time. The difference between the realized inflation rate and the target will decrease as 
the system returns to the steady state. Initially the margin of error allowed is 0.50 
percentage points and the range at every point in time there after is determined by 0.50 
(exp(1)/ exp(t))59. 
 In order to replicate the analysis of Chapter II a regime switch in the model 
should be considered. That is Brazil, Chile, and Mexico were under a managed fixed 
regime before adopting the gradual IT regime60. The comprehensive model was not 
used to analyze managed fixed exchange rate regimes. But the inflation setup can be 
used to analyze this scheme. Recall that the inflation rate of the non-traded good was 
determined by equation (11), here repeated as Equation (29), 
  *)(ˆ εεγπ −+= t
A
t
H
t E   (29) 
where AtEˆ , the expected currency depreciation rate, was replaced by tEˆ  because 
perfect foresight was assumed. One way to model the managed fixed regime is to 
assume now that the central bank announces that it will set the currency depreciation 
around a certain mean but that slight fluctuations will be observed61. Then the expected 
depreciation rate will be the mean depreciation but it will slightly differ, randomly, 
from the realized one. Then Equations (12) and (13) should be rewritten as follows: 
                                                
59 As t increases the difference between the allowed inflation rate and the point target decreases. 
60 The managed fixed regime refers to a nominal exchange rate regime in which the monetary authority 
announces that in average the depreciation rate will be around a certain level but slight fluctuations are 
observed. 
61 The reason why a strict fixed exchange rate regime is not used for the simulation is the same reason 
why the a gradual inflation targeting scheme was considered. Under a strict fixed exchange rate regime 
the rate of depreciation is constant, therefore it is not possible to analyze the correlation between 
inflation and depreciation. 
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   )*()ˆˆ(ˆ t
A
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  *))(1()ˆˆ(ˆ εεργρ −−+−+=Π tAttAtt EEE  (31). 
Notice that these equations are the same as (12) and (13) when perfect foresight 
is assumed. The slight random differences that will exist between the realized and the 
expected depreciation rates will introduce, once again, fluctuations that will be 
captured by the correlation analysis. The nice result of modeling the managed fixed 
regime in this way is that the real exchange rate will tend to be around the steady state 
and then at a certain point in time a regime switch can be introduced. That is, at time t 
the central bank can announce that it will follow an IT regime with a floating exchange 
rate. Once this announcement is made the model goes back to the perfect foresight 
equations of Chapter III. 
 
2. Nominal Exchange Rate Movements and the Correlation between Inflation and 
Domestic Currency Depreciation under Inflation Targeting 
 The regime switch considered here is one that resembles the case of Brazil but 
the intuitive result applies for the cases of Chile and Mexico. The central bank will 
abandon the managed fixed regime right after the world interest rate increases or the 
money demand shock takes place. This could be the result of not having the 
international reserves needed to satisfy the asset reallocation of the individuals or 
because the central bank is not willing to defend the currency with interest rate because 
of fiscal implications. Then they let the exchange rate adjust and adopt an IT regime.  
 The shock analyzed here is that of an unexpected once and for all increase in 
the world interest rate at time t, similar to the one analyzed in the previous section. 
Before time t the central bank was enforcing a managed fixed regime, as described 
above, with rates of currency depreciation with in the range of six percent +/-0.50 
percentage points. At time t the shock takes place. The central bank lets the exchange 
rate adjust and adopts a gradual inflation target of six percent with a decreasing range 
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of +/-0.50 percentage points62. The previous section showed that the central bank can 
use the interest rate or the international reserves as the monetary policy tool used to 
maintain the nominal exchange rate at the level that is consistent with the inflation 
target. Therefore the depreciation rate will be lower than the one that would have been 
obtained if a flexible exchange rate with a monetary rule had been in place.  
 Figure 14 presents the simulated paths for the overall inflation rate and the 
depreciation of the domestic currency. Before time t the system is under the managed 
fixed regime described above and after t is under the gradual IT regime. Table IV 
presents the rolling and increasing windows correlation coefficients calculated for the 
data in the graph. Notice that the values in the table match the results presented for 
Brazil, Chile, and Mexico in Chapter II. Before IT is adopted there is a highly positive 
linear relation between the two variables, while after the adoption the correlation 
decreases and even becomes negative.  
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Fig. 14. Simulated Data for the Inflation and Depreciation Rates. 
 
                                                
62 As explained before the range of +/ - 0.50 decreases as time passes by  0.50(exp(1) /exp(t)). 
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Table IV. Simulated Correlation between the Inflation and Depreciation Rates for a 
Regime Switch from Fixed Exchange Rate to an Inflation Targeting Regime 
 
 
 
3. Nominal Exchange Rate Pass-Through Effect into Inflation under Inflation 
Targeting 
In order to assess if the lower pass-through effects observed recently in Brazil, 
Chile, and Mexico is related to the adoption of IT, it is possible to perform a 
comparison between the pass-through effect that would be observed after a sudden 
nominal exchange rate movement under a managed fixed regime and under IT. The 
pass-through effect can be measured by looking at the ratio of the overall price level 
and the nominal exchange rate under each regime. This ratio illustrates the share of the 
domestic currency depreciation that translates into inflation. 
Appendix 3 shows a simple analytical framework that is used here to compute 
the ratio described above. This framework shares the same characteristics of the 
inflation framework described in chapter III, but for simplicity it is a discrete time 
framework. The two regimes considered are a managed fixed exchange rate and an 
strict IT regime. In the first case the central bank sets the rate of currency depreciation 
at three percent. While in the second the central bank sets the overall inflation target 
rate also at three percent. The key feature of the managed fixed regime is that after a 
shock hits the nominal exchange rate, the price level will be allowed to adjust as 
necessary as the system returns to equilibrium. For the IT regime, once the nominal 
exchange rate shock takes place, the monetary authority will set a path for the domestic 
currency depreciation that is consistent with the inflation target. This intervention in 
Period Increasing Windows Period Rolling Windows
t - 30 , t 0.9919 t - 30 , t 0.9959
t - 30  , t + 15 0.7608 t  - 15  , t + 15 0.8119
t - 30 , t  + 30 0.7392 t  , t  + 30 0.8142
t  - 30 , t  + 30 0.7352 t  + 15 , t  + 45 -0.5278
t - 30 , t  + 60 0.7348 t  + 30 , t  + 60 -0.4515
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the foreign exchange rate market is needed to offset the non-traded good inflation rate 
in such a way that the combination of the depreciation rate and the non-traded good 
inflation rate results in the overall inflation target. 
The nominal exchange rate shock under the managed fixed regime corresponds 
to a scenario in which the central bank devalues the currency by twenty percent and 
then fixes the rate of devaluation at three percent. For the IT regime, as it was 
presented in section B in this chapter, the sudden jump in the nominal exchange rate 
could be the result of an increase in the world interest rate while the central bank is 
pursuing an inflation target of three percent. For both cases the shock takes place at 
time τ.  Figure 15 presents the simulated data for the nominal exchange rate, the non-
traded good price level and the overall price level63.  
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Fig. 15. Simulated Data for the Nominal Exchange Rate (E), Non-Traded Good 
Price Level (Ph), and Overall Price Level (P). 
 
The vertical dotted lines in both graphs of Figure 15 represent time τ. At this 
point in time the nominal exchange rate jumps to the level determined by the shock, the 
overall price level also increases to a level determined by the share of the traded-good 
                                                
63 The corresponding values for the parameters of the simulation are 0.20 for the parameter that 
determines the degree of sluggishness of the non-traded good price, γ, 0.40 for the share of the traded 
good in the overall price index, ρ,  and an initial shock to the nominal exchange rate of 20  percent. For 
the inflation target the central bank sets a target of three percent for the overall inflation rate, while in the 
case of the managed fixed regime the central banks sets a rate of devaluation of three percent. 
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price in the overall price index, and, finally, the non-traded good price remains at the 
original level since it responds sluggishly, in other words it can not increase 
immediately. 
As mentioned above, the ratio that illustrates the magnitude of the pass-through 
effect under each regime is the ratio between the overall price level and the nominal 
exchange rate. Let r1 denote the ratio between the overall price level and the nominal 
exchange rate for the managed fixed regime, and r2 represent the ratio for the case of 
the IT regime. Then it is possible to assess if the pass-through effect is greater in one of 
the regimes by looking at R = r1 / r2. If the pass-through effect is higher under a 
managed regime, then R should be greater than one.  Figure 16 shows the results for R.  
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 Fig. 16. Ratio between the Pass-Through Effect under a Managed Fixed and the Pass-
through Effect under an Inflation Targeting Regime. 
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 The results presented in Figure 16 indicate that a lower pass-through effect is 
observed under IT. Appendix 3 shows that this result always holds and explains that 
the magnitude of the difference between the pass-through effects of both regimes 
depends on the share of traded goods in the overall price level, the degree of the non-
traded goods price sluggishness and the magnitude of the initial shock to the nominal 
exchange rate.  The higher the share of the traded good in the overall price level, the 
lower is the difference in pass-through effect between the two regimes. The degree of 
the sluggishness of the non-traded good affects the speed at which both pass-through 
effects converge to one, the less sluggish non-traded good price is the faster the 
convergence occurs. Finally the greater the initial change in the nominal exchange rate 
the greater will be the pass-through effect under the managed fixed regime with respect 
to the IT regime.   
The results of the simulations presented in sections 2 and 3 support the 
arguments that fear of floating practices in small open economies that adopted IT result 
in lower correlation between inflation and domestic currency depreciation and these 
practices can be related also to the lower exchange rate pass-through effects into 
inflation that have been observed recently. The direct or indirect interventions in the 
foreign exchange rate market result in lower rates of currency depreciation while the 
overall inflation is above the target. This situation translates into lower or even 
negative correlation coefficients in contrast to those observed for the period of time in 
which a managed float was in place.  
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CHAPTER V 
 
CONCLUSIONS 
 
 
In accordance with the current discussion of IT in emerging economies the 
objectives of this dissertation were to analyze the differences that emerge from using 
different monetary policy instruments to keep the overall inflation rate consistent with 
the inflation target and to investigate also the possible relationship between the 
adoption of IT in emerging economies, the declining correlation between inflation and 
depreciation, and the lower pass-through effects observed recently in these countries.   
The relevance of these objectives comes from the fact that previous studies 
have looked at the advantages and disadvantages of adopting IT instead of the 
alternative monetary rule regime, but so far no one has looked at the consequences of 
implementing IT by controlling the overall inflation rate with different policy 
instruments. Regarding the pass-through effect, the literature has shown that this effect 
has recently been decreasing in emerging economies and therefore the effects of 
domestic currency depreciation on inflation may no longer be an issue for emerging 
economies that adopted IT. The explanations offered so far for these results have not 
established a clear link between these results and the adoption of IT even though the 
reasoning used by some previous studies explicitly argues that central banks 
implementing IT may intervene, directly or indirectly, in the foreign exchange rate 
market (fear of floating) in order to smooth or control the effects of sudden exchange 
rate movements on the overall inflation rate. If such interventions do take place, the 
monetary authorities counteract sudden exchange rate movements and therefore the 
direct relation between inflation and currency depreciation breaks down. It is not the 
case then that the pass-through effect is no longer an issue, in fact it is still an issue, but 
it may no longer be observable by directly analyzing inflation and exchange rate data. 
The objectives pursued in this dissertation are clearly related. The fact that fear 
of floating observed in emerging economies brings about the question of what 
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economic consequences emerge from using different instruments to intervene directly 
or indirectly in the foreign exchange rate market as central banks try to keep the overall 
inflation rate consistent with the target. 
The empirical results obtained in Chapter II show that the correlation between 
inflation and depreciation of domestic currency, as well as the exchange rate pass-
through effect into inflation, has been decreasing over the past few years for Brazil, 
Chile, and Mexico. The results show also that these declines coincide with the adoption 
of IT. For the same period of time evidence of fear of floating is found for these 
economies. The simulation presented in Chapter IV illustrates that it is possible to 
relate the declines in the correlation between inflation and depreciation, and the lower 
pass-through effect to the fear of floating observed in emerging economies that adopt 
IT. This simulation matches the empirical results for the lower correlation levels 
between inflation and currency depreciation observed in the data and the lower 
magnitude of the pass-through effect. These results offer an alternative explanation for 
the declining pass-through effect observed recently, one that relates these declines 
directly to the adoption of IT and suggest also that the lower pass-through levels 
observed recently in the data may not be sufficient evidence to argue that the effects of 
domestic currency depreciation on inflation may no longer be an issue for emerging 
economies that adopted IT. In fact the fear of floating evidence points in the opposite 
direction, these effects are so strong that if they are ignored it would not be possible to 
maintain the inflation rate consistent with the target. 
 The evidence for fear of floating emerges from the analysis of the variability of 
the nominal exchange rate, international reserves and the nominal interest rate. The 
results presented in Chapter II can be used to argue that fear of floating in Mexico is 
characterized by the heavy usage of the interest rate as the policy instrument used to 
indirectly affect the nominal exchange rate. Fear of floating in Brazil however is 
characterized by the heavy usage of international reserve to keep the depreciation rate 
consistent with the inflation target. In other words two emerging economies that 
adopted IT use two different policy instruments to comply with their inflation target.  
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This is basically the motivation for the comprehensive model described in Chapter III 
and the simulations presented in Chapter IV, where the questions about the differences 
that arise from using one instrument or the other to comply with the inflation target, 
and the advantages and disadvantages that IT has over the monetary rule are addressed 
using this comprehensive model. 
The results obtained indicate that the answers for both questions –about which 
regime is better, IT or a monetary rule, and which IT regime is better, IT with reserves 
or IT with interest rates – depend on the direction of the shock that is being analyzed. 
Despite this, there is a recommendation that still can be extracted from this analysis: if 
emerging economies decide to use IT as their monetary policy regime the optimal 
policy for the central bank, based on welfare, is to use international reserves to 
maintain the inflation target when there is an increase in the world interest rate or a 
positive money demand shock, and interest rate policy should be used when the 
opposite shocks take place. 
One more thing to notice is that after the world interest rate increases or there is 
a money demand shock, the central bank that is implementing an IT regime, no matter 
which instrument is used, will be forced to directly or indirectly influence the nominal 
exchange rate in order to comply with the inflation target. This behavior is something 
that should be expected in emerging economies with IT regimes in place and should be 
differentiated from the standard fear of floating since it is justified by the IT mandate to 
comply with a specific inflation target. 
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APPENDIX 1 
 
 
 
Data Sources and Description 
 
Brazil Chile Mexico
CPI data
Broad National Consumer Price 
Index (IPCA) reported by the 
Central Bank (www.bcb.gov.br)
Consumer Price Index (CPI) 
reported by the Central Bank 
(www.bcentral.cl)
Consumer Price Index (CPI) 
reported by the Central Bank 
(www.banxico.org.mx)
Inflation Targets Different Annual Monetary Policy Reports (www.bcb.gov.br)
Different Annual Monetary Policy 
Reports (www.bcentral.cl)
Different Annual Monetary Policy 
Reports (www.banxico.org.mx)
Nominal Exchange Rate
Average Nominal Exchange Rate 
reported by the Central Bank 
(www.bcb.gov.br)
Average Nominal Exchange Rate 
reported by the Central Bank 
(www.bcentral.cl)
Average Nominal Exchange Rate 
reported by the Central Bank 
(www.banxico.org.mx)
Real Exchange Rate
Real Exchange Rate calculated 
using the broad national 
consumer price index for non-
tradable goods and tradable 
goods both reported by the
Real Exchange Rate reported by 
the Central Bank 
(www.bcentral.cl)
Real Exchange Rate reported by 
the Central Bank 
(www.banxico.org.mx)
Industrial Production Index
Industrial Production Index 
reported by the Central Bank 
(www.bcb.gov.br)
Industrial Production Index 
reported by the Central Bank 
(www.bcentral.cl)
Industrial Production Index 
reported by the Central Bank 
(www.banxico.org.mx)
Controlled Prices
Broad National Consumer Price 
Index (IPCA) - Supervised Prices 
reported by the Central Bank 
(www.bcb.gov.br)
NA
Administired Prices Index 
reported by the Central Bank 
(www.banxico.org.mx)
Wage Average Earnings reported by the Central Bank (www.bcb.gov.br)
Real Labor Cost Index reported 
by the Central Bank 
(www.bcentral.cl)
Minimum Wage Index reported by 
the Central Bank 
(www.banxico.org.mx)
M1 M1 reported by the Central Bank (www.bcb.gov.br)
M1 index reported by the Central 
Bank (www.bcentral.cl)
M1 reported by the Central Bank 
(www.banxico.org.mx)
International Reserves
International Reserves - Total 
reported by the Central Bank 
(www.bcb.gov.br)
International Reserves - Reserve 
Assets (New Series) reported by 
the Central Bank 
(www.bcentral.cl)
International Reserves reported 
by the Central Bank 
(www.banxico.org.mx)
Nominal Interest Rate
Interest Rate - Selic reported by 
the Central Bank 
(www.bcb.gov.br)
Monetary Policy Nominal Interest 
Rate reported by the Central Bank 
(www.bcentral.cl)
Cetes 28 days reported by the 
Central Bank 
(www.banxico.org.mx)
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CPI
Exchange Rate CCPI Wages M1 CPI
Exchange Rate CCPI Wages M1
Wages
M1
M1
CCPI
CPI
Exchange Rate CCPI Wages CPI
Exchange Rate CCPI Wages M1 CPI
M1 CPI
Exchange Rate
Exchange Rate CCPI Wages
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Fig. A.1.1 Impulse Response Functions for Vector Error Correction Model for Brazil 
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Fig. A.1.2 Impulse Response Functions for Vector Error Correction Model for Chile 
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Fig. A.1.3 Impulse Response Functions for Vector Error Correction Model for Mexico 
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Fig. A.1.4 Impulse Response Functions for Vector Error Correction Model For Brazil 
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Fig. A.1.5 Impulse Response Functions for Vector Error Correction Model for Chile 
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Fig. A.1.6 Impulse Response Functions for Vector Error Correction Model for Mexico 
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Table A.1.I Increasing Windows Estimated Coefficients for Equation (2) for Brazil 
1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 
One month Accumulated Rates Nine Months Accumulated Rates 
C -0.75 -0.53 -0.19 -0.11 -0.11 C -12.46 -19.8 -13.8 -8.30 -9.26 
S.E. 0.94 0.73 0.57 0.48 0.43 S.E. 23.17 16.5 11.7 8.57 7.30 
t-stat -0.80 -0.72 -0.33 -0.23 -0.26 t-stat -0.54 -1.22 -1.16 -0.98 -1.27 
Depr. 0.03 0.01 -0.002 -0.003 -0.004 Depr. 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.99 0.99 
S.E. 0.14 0.07 0.06 0.05 0.05 S.E. 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.01 
t-stat 0.24 0.14 -0.03 -0.05 -0.09 t-stat 49.55 54.3 58.4 62.6 66.7 
IPI 0.01 0.00 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 IPI 0.49 0.30 0.05 -0.03 0.05 
S.E. 0.09 0.07 0.06 0.06 0.05 S.E. 1.51 1.22 1.02 0.91 0.82 
t-stat 0.09 0.00 -0.15 -0.13 -0.18 t-stat 0.33 0.25 0.05 -0.03 0.06 
Real E -0.41 -0.37 -0.30 -0.28 -0.28 Real E -5.33 -6.36 -4.48 -2.93 -3.20 
S.E. 0.22 0.18 0.15 0.13 0.12 S.E. 5.32 4.33 3.36 2.56 2.33 
t-stat -1.88 -2.03 -2.02 -2.11 -2.24 t-stat -1.00 -1.47 -1.31 -1.15 -1.38 
Ini. Inf. 1.00 1.01 1.00 0.99 0.99 Ini. Inf. 0.04 0.05 0.04 0.02 0.03 
S.E. 0.13 0.08 0.07 0.06 0.06 S.E. 0.05 0.04 0.03 0.02 0.02 
t-stat 7.43 12.98 14.62 15.82 17.33 t-stat 0.85 1.38 1.24 1.07 1.29 
Three-months Accumulated Rates Twelve-months Accumulated Rates 
C 6.06 0.48 -0.09 -0.79 -1.10 C -33.89 -37.14 -33.62 -16.68 -14.9 
S.E. 2.41 2.64 2.07 1.71 1.56 S.E. 60.63 41.45 29.58 20.43 16.8 
t-stat 2.50 0.22 -0.05 -0.47 -0.70 t-stat -0.55 -0.91 -1.12 -0.82 -0.88 
Depr. 1.01 0.90 0.88 0.88 0.86 Depr. 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.99 0.99 
S.E. 0.04 0.05 0.05 0.04 0.04 S.E. 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.01 
t-stat 25.7
2
18.6
2
18.60 19.72 19.93 t-stat 48.88 54.99 60.42 65.01 69.5 
IPI -0.13 -0.10 -0.09 -0.08 -0.06 IPI -4.78 -3.35 -3.05 -2.90 -2.73 
S.E. 0.21 0.24 0.22 0.20 0.19 S.E. 3.62 2.86 2.36 2.08 1.87 
t-stat -0.63 -0.43 -0.40 -0.40 -0.34 t-stat -1.32 -1.17 -1.30 -1.39 -1.46 
Real E 1.59 0.59 0.46 0.34 0.29 Real E -11.44 -12.53 -11.12 -6.63 -6.21 
S.E. 0.57 0.70 0.58 0.51 0.49 S.E. 13.38 10.55 8.40 6.04 5.33 
t-stat 2.77 0.88 0.79 0.66 0.58 t-stat -0.85 -1.19 -1.31 -1.10 -1.17 
Ini. Inf. -0.14 0.03 0.06 0.08 0.09 Ini. Inf. 0.04 0.05 0.04 0.03 0.02 
S.E. 0.06 0.07 0.06 0.05 0.05 S.E. 0.05 0.04 0.03 0.02 0.02 
t-stat -2.29 0.45 1.02 1.40 1.80 t-stat 0.82 1.18 1.34 1.14 1.21 
Six-months Accumulated Rates
C -6.7 -10.6 -5.90 -4.74 -5.49 
S.E. 7.73 6.36 4.69 3.68 3.25       
t-stat -0.9 -1.68 -1.23 -1.30 -1.69 Notes:      
Depr. 1.00 0.99 0.99 0.99 0.99 C: Constant. 
S.E. 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 Depr: Accumulated depreciation over the different time periods. 
t-stat 44.3 43.36 44.87 47.60 49.75 IPI: Deviation from industrial production from H-P trend. 
IPI 1.60 1.07 0.80 0.68 0.73 Real  E: Real exchange rate deviation from H-P trend. 
S.E. 0.57 0.52 0.45 0.40 0.37 Ini. Inf.: Initial Inflation. 
t-stat 2.78 2.06 1.76 1.67 1.95       
Real E -2.80 -3.13 -1.84 -1.43 -1.57       
S.E. 1.81 1.68 1.33 1.10 1.03       
t-stat -1.55 -1.87 -1.36 -1.31 -1.53       
Ini. Inf. 0.05 0.06 0.04 0.03 0.04       
S.E. 0.04 0.04 0.03 0.03 0.03       
t-stat 1.13 1.66 1.22 1.18 1.43       
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Table A.1.II Rolling Windows Estimated Coefficients for Equation (2) for Brazil 
1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 
One month Accumulated Rates Nine Months Accumulated Rates 
C -0.69 -0.15 0.17 0.26 0.26  C -12.44 -9.84 3.22 2.22 3.76 
S.E. 0.97 0.44 0.08 0.07 0.08  S.E. 23.18 10.49 0.99 0.52 0.73 
t-stat -0.70 0.86 2.22 3.50 3.45  t-stat -0.54 -1.60 4.85 4.28 5.12 
Depr. 0.02 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.01  Depr. 1.00 0.90 0.04 0.02 0.01 
S.E. 0.14 0.04 0.01 0.01 0.01  S.E. 0.02 0.02 0.03 0.01 0.01 
t-stat 0.11 0.28 0.87 0.79 0.93  t-stat 49.44 46.10 0.48 1.60 0.76 
IPI -0.02 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01  IPI 0.51 0.20 0.00 -0.02 -0.01 
S.E. 0.10 0.05 0.01 0.01 0.01  S.E. 1.51 0.79 0.08 0.03 0.03 
t-stat -0.18 -0.26 -1.00 -1.59 -1.06  t-stat 0.34 -0.22 0.10 -0.64 -0.34 
Real E -0.39 -0.19 -0.02 0.00 0.00  Real E -5.31 -2.28 -0.69 0.18 0.21 
S.E. 0.24 0.12 0.02 0.02 0.03  S.E. 5.32 2.78 0.27 0.10 0.11 
t-stat -1.64 -1.17 -1.17 -0.25 0.15  t-stat -1.00 -1.13 -2.23 1.72 1.88 
Ini. Inf. 1.00 0.75 0.63 0.44 0.45  Ini. Inf. 0.04 0.03 0.06 0.37 0.10 
S.E. 0.14 0.08 0.10 0.12 0.12  S.E. 0.05 0.02 0.01 0.07 0.13 
t-stat 7.16 9.09 6.67 3.78 3.63  t-stat 0.84 2.16 6.42 5.58 0.82 
Three-months Accumulated Rates  Twelve-months Accumulated Rates 
C 6.34 1.53 0.57 1.14 1.13  C -33.89 -18.22 -3.32 4.52 5.55 
S.E. 2.42 1.61 0.26 0.24 0.26  S.E. 60.63 25.51 2.21 0.59 0.79 
t-stat 2.61 2.23 2.26 4.76 4.43  t-stat -0.55 -1.44 1.99 7.84 7.02 
Depr. 1.00 0.45 0.03 0.02 0.02  Depr. 1.00 0.97 0.25 0.00 0.00 
S.E. 0.04 0.04 0.01 0.01 0.01  S.E. 0.02 0.02 0.03 0.01 0.01 
t-stat 25.3 9.36 2.84 2.27 2.58  t-stat 48.88 65.98 5.72 0.20 0.36 
IPI -0.13 -0.16 -0.01 -0.02 -0.01  IPI -4.78 -0.98 -0.04 -0.05 -0.03 
S.E. 0.21 0.16 0.02 0.02 0.02  S.E. 3.62 1.75 0.16 0.04 0.04 
t-stat -0.59 -0.65 -0.34 -1.13 -0.45  t-stat -1.32 -0.10 -0.55 -1.23 -0.83 
Real E 1.76 0.40 -0.04 -0.02 0.01  Real E -11.44 -4.76 -2.09 0.01 0.28 
S.E. 0.59 0.45 0.06 0.05 0.07  S.E. 13.38 6.40 0.60 0.14 0.13 
t-stat 2.99 0.38 -0.62 -0.51 0.23  t-stat -0.85 -0.93 -3.07 0.21 2.18 
Ini. Inf. -0.15 0.04 0.52 0.11 0.14  Ini. Inf. 0.04 0.02 0.02 0.17 0.03 
S.E. 0.06 0.05 0.09 0.12 0.15  S.E. 0.05 0.02 0.00 0.03 0.10 
t-stat -2.47 1.77 5.69 0.89 0.91  t-stat 0.82 1.67 7.32 6.11 0.59 
Six-months Accumulated Rates   
C -6.41 -4.61 1.99 1.38 2.16        
S.E. 7.74 4.31 0.52 0.41 0.55        
t-stat -0.81 -0.74 3.24 3.28 3.97  Notes:      
Depr. 1.00 0.69 0.03 0.03 0.02  C: Constant. 
S.E. 0.02 0.03 0.02 0.01 0.01  Depr: Accumulated depreciation over the different time periods. 
t-stat 43.7 25.45 2.12 2.84 2.18  IPI: Deviation from industrial production from H-P trend. 
IPI 1.67 0.45 -0.01 -0.03 -0.02  Real  E: Real exchange rate deviation from H-P trend. 
S.E. 0.58 0.36 0.04 0.02 0.02  Ini. Inf.: Initial Inflation. 
t-stat 2.88 0.56 -0.60 -1.32 -0.66        
Real E -2.64 -1.31 0.01 0.08 0.12        
S.E. 1.82 1.18 0.13 0.07 0.10        
t-stat -1.44 -1.33 0.45 1.04 1.17        
Ini. Inf. 0.05 0.05 0.36 0.37 0.16        
S.E. 0.04 0.03 0.04 0.10 0.16        
t-stat 1.06 2.76 7.08 4.24 1.02        
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Table A.1.III Increasing Windows Estimated Coefficients for Equation (2) for Chile 
 1996 1999 2000 2001 2002   1996 1999 2000 2001 2002 
 One month Accumulated Rates Nine Months Accumulated Rates 
C 0.65 0.43 0.38 0.35 0.31  C 2.68 0.62 0.44 0.48 0.36 
S.E. 0.15 0.09 0.08 0.07 0.07  S.E. 0.58 0.35 0.32 0.29 0.29 
t-stat 4.44 4.71 4.74 4.79 4.63  t-stat 4.59 1.75 1.40 1.65 1.24 
Depr. 0.02 -0.01 -0.02 -0.02 0.00  Depr. 0.23 0.16 0.12 0.10 0.05 
S.E. 0.05 0.04 0.03 0.03 0.03  S.E. 0.04 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.02 
t-stat 0.30 -0.37 -0.59 -0.61 -0.10  t-stat 6.31 4.83 3.88 3.51 2.25 
IPI 0.01 0.00 0.17 0.00 0.00  IPI -0.03 0.00 0.02 0.02 0.02 
S.E. 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01  S.E. 0.03 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 
t-stat 0.57 0.11 -0.07 -0.22 -0.48  t-stat -1.14 -0.07 0.75 0.82 0.75 
Real E 0.00 0.02 0.02 0.01 0.01  Real E 0.20 0.24 0.22 0.21 0.12 
S.E. 0.03 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02  S.E. 0.07 0.07 0.06 0.06 0.05 
t-stat 0.07 0.95 0.83 0.80 0.34  t-stat 2.87 3.60 3.56 3.70 2.36 
Ini. Inf. 0.30 0.43 0.46 0.48 0.50  Ini. Inf. 0.50 0.69 0.72 0.73 0.75 
S.E. 0.14 0.10 0.09 0.08 0.08  S.E. 0.06 0.04 0.03 0.03 0.03 
t-stat 2.20 4.43 5.19 5.71 6.31  t-stat 9.01 18.04 20.98 23.02 23.8 
Three-months Accumulated Rates  Twelve-months Accumulated Rates 
C 2.67 1.54 1.29 1.15 1.06  C 3.77 0.87 0.57 0.66 0.69 
S.E. 0.43 0.27 0.24 0.22 0.21  S.E. 0.44 0.36 0.35 0.32 0.33 
t-stat 6.29 5.71 5.40 5.21 5.07  t-stat 8.52 2.41 1.66 2.08 2.12 
Depr. 0.18 0.11 0.07 0.05 0.01  Depr. 0.25 0.18 0.13 0.11 0.05 
S.E. 0.07 0.06 0.05 0.05 0.04  S.E. 0.02 0.03 0.03 0.02 0.02 
t-stat 2.55 1.93 1.33 0.99 0.21  t-stat 10.65 6.17 4.57 4.47 2.33 
IPI 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.00  IPI 0.01 0.02 0.03 0.02 0.03 
S.E. 0.03 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02  S.E. 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 
t-stat -0.12 0.24 0.48 0.32 0.01  t-stat 0.26 0.89 1.24 1.23 1.26 
Real E 0.15 0.19 0.16 0.14 0.04  Real E 0.32 0.34 0.30 0.27 0.18 
S.E. 0.09 0.07 0.07 0.06 0.05  S.E. 0.06 0.07 0.07 0.06 0.05 
t-stat 1.65 2.70 2.44 2.31 0.74  t-stat 5.77 5.15 4.43 4.85 3.21 
Ini. Inf. -0.01 0.28 0.36 0.40 0.42  Ini. Inf. 0.45 0.64 0.67 0.67 0.68 
S.E. 0.13 0.10 0.09 0.09 0.08  S.E. 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.02 0.02 
t-stat -0.07 2.80 3.95 4.66 5.08  t-stat 15.52 24.29 26.43 29.31 28.6
9
Six-months Accumulated Rates   
C 3.96 1.54 1.19 1.04 0.92        
S.E. 0.76 0.46 0.39 0.36 0.35        
t-stat 5.21 3.33 3.03 2.86 2.65  Notes:      
Depr. 0.26 0.18 0.14 0.10 0.04  C: Constant. 
S.E. 0.07 0.06 0.05 0.05 0.04  Depr: Accumulated depreciation over the different time periods. 
t-stat 3.86 3.05 2.64 2.12 1.14  IPI: Deviation from industrial production from H-P trend. 
IPI -0.04 0.01 0.03 0.03 0.03  Real  E: Real exchange rate deviation from H-P trend. 
S.E. 0.04 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03  Ini. Inf.: Initial Inflation. 
t-stat -1.02 0.45 1.19 1.26 1.17        
Real E 0.22 0.25 0.25 0.21 0.07        
S.E. 0.11 0.10 0.09 0.08 0.07        
t-stat 1.94 2.61 2.72 2.47 0.99        
Ini. Inf. 0.18 0.52 0.58 0.61 0.65        
S.E. 0.11 0.08 0.07 0.06 0.06        
t-stat 1.62 6.50 8.44 9.56 10.42        
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Table A.1.IV Rolling Windows Estimated Coefficients for Equation (2) for Chile 
 1996 1999 2000 2001 2002   1996 1999 2000 2001 2002 
 One month Accumulated Rates Nine Months Accumulated Rates 
C 0.70 0.41 0.33 0.32 0.22  C 2.70 1.66 1.41 2.13 2.11 
S.E. 0.14 0.08 0.07 0.07 0.06  S.E. 0.58 0.50 0.52 0.37 0.46 
t-stat 4.88 5.05 4.71 4.59 3.62  t-stat 4.60 3.37 2.85 5.86 4.73 
Depr. 0.02 -0.04 -0.04 -0.02 0.03  Depr. 0.23 0.05 -0.04 -0.06 -0.05 
S.E. 0.05 0.03 0.03 0.02 0.02  S.E. 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.03 0.02 
t-stat 0.48 -1.56 -1.48 -0.69 1.24  t-stat 6.29 1.41 -1.15 -2.33 -2.55 
IPI 0.02 0.00 0.00 0.00 -0.01  IPI -0.03 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.00 
S.E. 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01  S.E. 0.03 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 
t-stat 1.20 -0.11 -0.38 -0.54 -0.77  t-stat -1.15 0.25 1.09 1.51 0.30 
Real E 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00 -0.01  Real E 0.20 0.27 0.13 0.09 -0.01 
S.E. 0.03 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.01  S.E. 0.07 0.08 0.07 0.05 0.05 
t-stat -0.09 0.41 0.18 0.20 -0.96  t-stat 2.83 3.40 1.81 1.93 -0.08 
Ini. Inf. 0.19 0.20 0.26 0.16 0.19  Ini. Inf. 0.50 0.52 0.61 0.44 0.36 
S.E. 0.14 0.13 0.13 0.14 0.14  S.E. 0.06 0.07 0.09 0.07 0.11 
t-stat 1.35 1.54 1.92 1.13 1.41  t-stat 8.92 7.21 6.86 6.17 3.30 
Three-months Accumulated Rates  Twelve-months Accumulated Rates 
C 2.64 1.52 1.30 1.25 1.21  C 3.77 0.45 1.81 2.59 2.95 
S.E. 0.40 0.20 0.17 0.16 0.15  S.E. 0.44 0.74 0.85 0.56 0.52 
t-stat 6.58 7.57 7.65 7.86 7.92  t-stat 8.52 0.38 2.19 4.77 5.74 
Depr. 0.11 -0.05 -0.07 -0.05 -0.02  Depr. 0.25 0.13 -0.03 -0.05 -0.07 
S.E. 0.07 0.04 0.03 0.03 0.02  S.E. 0.02 0.04 0.04 0.03 0.02 
t-stat 1.62 -1.29 -1.97 -1.94 -1.15  t-stat 10.65 3.68 -0.70 -1.82 -3.46 
IPI 0.01 0.03 0.03 0.02 0.02  IPI 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.02 0.01 
S.E. 0.03 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01  S.E. 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 
t-stat 0.53 2.16 2.30 1.74 1.83  t-stat 0.26 0.05 0.51 1.00 0.57 
Real E 0.04 0.07 0.03 0.02 -0.06  Real E 0.32 0.37 0.21 0.17 0.09 
S.E. 0.09 0.06 0.05 0.04 0.03  S.E. 0.06 0.08 0.08 0.05 0.05 
t-stat 0.46 1.16 0.69 0.58 -2.39  t-stat 5.77 4.81 2.68 3.16 1.85 
Ini. Inf. -0.01 0.03 0.08 -0.03 -0.25  Ini. Inf. 0.45 0.68 0.58 0.47 0.38 
S.E. 0.13 0.12 0.12 0.12 0.13  S.E. 0.03 0.08 0.10 0.07 0.08 
t-stat -0.09 0.29 0.66 -0.23 -1.87  t-stat 15.52 9.88 6.15 6.67 4.49 
Six-months Accumulated Rates   
C 4.23 2.03 1.64 1.64 2.00        
S.E. 0.77 0.33 0.31 0.27 0.32        
t-stat 5.52 6.34 5.27 6.01 6.34  Notes:      
Depr. 0.23 -0.06 -0.05 -0.07 -0.06  C: Constant. 
S.E. 0.07 0.04 0.04 0.03 0.02  Depr: Accumulated depreciation over the different time periods. 
t-stat 3.33 -1.75 -1.47 -2.31 -2.96  IPI: Deviation from industrial production from H-P trend. 
IPI -0.04 0.04 0.04 0.03 0.03  Real  E: Real exchange rate deviation from H-P trend. 
S.E. 0.04 0.02 0.02 0.01 0.01  Ini. Inf.: Initial Inflation. 
t-stat -0.86 2.05 2.65 2.23 1.82        
Real E 0.14 0.14 0.12 0.01 -0.12        
S.E. 0.12 0.07 0.07 0.06 0.04        
t-stat 1.26 1.96 1.81 0.22 -2.99        
Ini. Inf. 0.14 0.33 0.42 0.36 0.08        
S.E. 0.12 0.08 0.09 0.09 0.13        
t-stat 1.20 4.20 4.67 4.15 0.67        
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Table A.1.V Increasing Windows Estimated Coefficients for Equation (2) for Mexico 
 1996 1999 2000 2001 2002   1996 1999 2000 2001 2002 
 One month Accumulated Rates Nine Months Accumulated Rates 
C 0.63 0.57 0.53 0.49 0.48  C 2.26 2.66 2.84 2.98 3.06 
S.E. 0.20 0.16 0.15 0.14 0.13  S.E. 1.76 1.36 1.23 1.13 1.03 
t-stat 3.10 3.61 3.61 3.59 3.75  t-stat 1.28 1.96 2.31 2.65 2.96 
Depr. 0.16 0.15 0.15 0.15 0.15  Depr. 0.73 0.72 0.71 0.71 0.71 
S.E. 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02  S.E. 0.04 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03 
t-stat 6.69 7.45 7.68 7.87 8.00  t-stat 18.53 20.85 21.73 22.69 23.5 
IPI 0.10 0.10 0.10 0.09 0.08  IPI -0.28 -0.07 -0.04 -0.01 0.01 
S.E. 0.04 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03  S.E. 0.32 0.26 0.25 0.23 0.21 
t-stat 2.74 3.37 3.38 3.35 3.28  t-stat -0.86 -0.25 -0.16 -0.06 0.06 
Real E 0.06 0.06 0.05 0.05 0.05  Real E 0.75 0.70 0.70 0.70 0.70 
S.E. 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01  S.E. 0.13 0.11 0.10 0.10 0.09 
t-stat 3.59 4.20 4.23 4.26 4.25  t-stat 5.91 6.64 7.00 7.30 7.58 
Ini. Inf. 0.62 0.63 0.64 0.64 0.65  Ini. Inf. 0.28 0.29 0.29 0.29 0.29 
S.E. 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.04 0.04  S.E. 0.04 0.04 0.03 0.03 0.03 
t-stat 11.3 13.19 13.94 14.64 15.31  t-stat 7.11 8.21 8.56 8.90 9.28 
Three-months Accumulated Rates  Twelve-months Accumulated Rates 
C 1.90 1.84 1.75 1.65 1.61  C 3.09 2.45 2.87 3.24 3.57 
S.E. 0.65 0.50 0.46 0.42 0.39  S.E. 2.28 1.82 1.66 1.52 1.39 
t-stat 2.95 3.70 3.84 3.92 4.12  t-stat 1.39 1.35 1.74 2.14 2.57 
Depr. 0.36 0.35 0.35 0.36 0.35  Depr. 0.89 0.86 0.86 0.86 0.85 
S.E. 0.04 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03  S.E. 0.04 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03 
t-stat 9.71 11.0 11.48 11.93 12.31  t-stat 24.89 26.30 27.23 28.33 29.4 
IPI 0.20 0.21 0.20 0.18 0.17  IPI -0.61 -0.28 -0.25 -0.20 -0.16 
S.E. 0.12 0.10 0.09 0.08 0.08  S.E. 0.41 0.34 0.32 0.30 0.28 
t-stat 1.70 2.12 2.17 2.09 2.15  t-stat -1.52 -0.81 -0.77 -0.67 -0.57 
Real E 0.22 0.21 0.21 0.21 0.21  Real E 1.55 1.22 1.21 1.21 1.21 
S.E. 0.05 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04  S.E. 0.17 0.14 0.13 0.13 0.12 
t-stat 4.45 5.24 5.39 5.51 5.68  t-stat 8.90 8.61 8.97 9.33 9.70 
Ini. Inf. 0.44 0.45 0.45 0.46 0.46  Ini. Inf. 0.20 0.22 0.22 0.22 0.22 
S.E. 0.06 0.05 0.05 0.04 0.04  S.E. 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03 
t-stat 7.99 9.29 9.77 10.24 10.75  t-stat 5.89 7.15 7.42 7.66 7.91 
Six-months Accumulated Rates   
C 2.82 2.96 2.92 2.81 2.78        
S.E. 1.26 0.96 0.87 0.80 0.74        
t-stat 2.24 3.10 3.34 3.51 3.76  Notes:      
Depr. 0.55 0.54 0.54 0.54 0.54  C: Constant. 
S.E. 0.04 0.04 0.03 0.03 0.03  Depr: Accumulated depreciation over the different time periods. 
t-stat 13.1 14.98 15.66 16.36 16.93  IPI: Deviation from industrial production from H-P trend. 
IPI 0.24 0.27 0.28 0.25 0.25  Real  E: Real exchange rate deviation from H-P trend. 
S.E. 0.23 0.19 0.18 0.16 0.15  Ini. Inf.: Initial Inflation. 
t-stat 1.04 1.47 1.58 1.56 1.67        
Real E 0.47 0.46 0.46 0.45 0.45        
S.E. 0.09 0.08 0.07 0.07 0.07        
t-stat 5.03 5.93 6.20 6.39 6.63        
Ini. Inf. 0.35 0.35 0.35 0.36 0.36        
S.E. 0.05 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04        
t-stat 7.08 8.19 8.57 8.97 9.38        
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Table A.1.VI Rolling Windows Estimated Coefficients for Equation (2) for Mexico 
 1996 1999 2000 2001 2002   1996 1999 2000 2001 2002 
 One month Accumulated Rates Nine Months Accumulated Rates 
C 0.47 0.65 0.43 0.23 0.25  C 6.35 9.70 7.61 2.93 1.59 
S.E. 0.14 0.17 0.15 0.13 0.10  S.E. 1.95 2.13 1.49 0.67 0.61 
t-stat 3.36 3.87 2.92 1.81 2.44  t-stat 3.34 4.55 5.32 4.41 2.58 
Depr. 0.06 0.06 0.04 0.01 0.00  Depr. 0.34 0.29 0.39 0.29 0.33 
S.E. 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.02  S.E. 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.04 0.04 
t-stat 7.61 6.32 2.73 0.41 0.20  t-stat 10.76 9.17 12.34 7.03 7.34 
IPI 0.03 0.05 0.04 0.04 0.02  IPI 0.06 0.20 0.34 0.28 0.25 
S.E. 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.01  S.E. 0.22 0.25 0.19 0.08 0.07 
t-stat 1.92 2.58 1.89 2.03 1.16  t-stat 0.26 0.81 2.04 3.28 3.61 
Real E 0.04 0.05 0.04 0.02 0.01  Real E 0.36 0.38 0.33 0.16 0.23 
S.E. 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01  S.E. 0.08 0.08 0.06 0.05 0.07 
t-stat 4.33 5.21 3.55 1.61 0.83  t-stat 4.39 5.10 6.25 3.16 3.46 
Ini. Inf. 0.62 0.54 0.65 0.77 0.70  Ini. Inf. 0.20 0.14 0.21 0.47 0.57 
S.E. 0.08 0.09 0.09 0.09 0.10  S.E. 0.13 0.11 0.08 0.05 0.05 
t-stat 7.48 5.96 6.88 8.14 7.31  t-stat 1.54 1.24 3.09 10.50 10.9 
Three-months Accumulated Rates  Twelve-months Accumulated Rates 
C 4.86 6.34 4.01 1.79 1.34  C 7.35 13.33 12.53 6.44 3.51 
S.E. 0.70 0.78 0.57 0.50 0.35  S.E. 2.88 2.52 1.89 0.99 0.91 
t-stat 6.95 8.10 7.06 3.58 3.87  t-stat 2.65 5.28 6.77 6.49 3.89 
Depr. 0.18 0.16 0.20 0.16 0.13  Depr. 0.41 0.34 0.41 0.40 0.33 
S.E. 0.02 0.02 0.04 0.05 0.04  S.E. 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.05 0.06 
t-stat 7.37 6.83 5.46 3.20 3.00  t-stat 12.70 11.15 15.34 8.72 5.33 
IPI -0.06 0.00 0.08 0.13 0.13  IPI 0.28 0.45 0.05 0.04 0.06 
S.E. 0.10 0.10 0.09 0.06 0.05  S.E. 0.24 0.25 0.20 0.12 0.10 
t-stat -0.58 -0.04 0.97 2.03 2.86  t-stat 1.19 1.82 0.20 0.30 0.59 
Real E 0.27 0.29 0.22 0.12 0.09  Real E 0.64 0.66 0.50 0.28 0.17 
S.E. 0.04 0.04 0.03 0.04 0.04  S.E. 0.11 0.08 0.07 0.07 0.10 
t-stat 6.62 7.66 6.34 3.45 2.46  t-stat 6.24 7.97 7.57 4.89 1.71 
Ini. Inf. -0.28 -0.37 -0.04 0.39 0.44  Ini. Inf. 0.21 0.08 0.08 0.29 0.44 
S.E. 0.14 0.14 0.11 0.12 0.11  S.E. 0.14 0.09 0.07 0.04 0.05 
t-stat -1.98 -2.74 -0.26 3.30 4.15  t-stat 1.45 0.97 1.19 6.69 8.29 
Six-months Accumulated Rates   
C 7.18 9.44 7.39 2.96 2.18        
S.E. 1.32 1.57 1.16 0.80 0.63        
t-stat 5.45 6.04 6.34 3.70 3.50  Notes:      
Depr. 0.27 0.23 0.27 0.25 0.24  C: Constant. 
S.E. 0.03 0.03 0.05 0.06 0.05  Depr: Accumulated depreciation over the different time periods. 
t-stat 8.58 7.74 6.43 4.30 4.32  IPI: Deviation from industrial production from H-P trend. 
IPI 0.01 0.08 0.19 0.23 0.25  Real  E: Real exchange rate deviation from H-P trend. 
S.E. 0.19 0.22 0.17 0.10 0.08  Ini. Inf.: Initial Inflation. 
t-stat 0.06 0.35 1.22 2.40 3.37        
Real E 0.35 0.35 0.29 0.21 0.17        
S.E. 0.07 0.06 0.06 0.06 0.07        
t-stat 5.08 5.50 5.17 3.47 2.51        
Ini. Inf. -0.07 -0.10 0.03 0.41 0.47        
S.E. 0.14 0.14 0.11 0.09 0.09        
t-stat -0.52 -0.70 0.49 4.62 5.22        
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Table A.1.VII Increasing Windows Estimated Coefficients for Equation (2) for Brazil 
 (No Hyperinflation Sub-Sample) 
  1999 2000 2001 2002    1999 2000 2001 2002 
 One month Accumulated Rates Nine Months Accumulated Rates 
C  0.068 0.129 0.160 0.176  C  4.402 5.280 5.525 5.496 
S.E.  0.094 0.078 0.072 0.068  S.E.  1.559 0.943 0.627 0.546 
t-stat  0.748 1.644 2.207 2.592  t-stat  2.836 5.861 8.825 10.069 
Depr.  0.007 0.007 0.005 0.005  Depr.  0.000 -0.012 -0.014 -0.008 
S.E.  0.006 0.006 0.006 0.006  S.E.  0.044 0.029 0.025 0.022 
t-stat  1.177 1.042 0.856 0.798  t-stat  -0.055 -0.411 -0.542 -0.336 
IPI  -0.004 -0.002 -0.003 -0.003  IPI  0.104 0.063 0.053 0.042 
S.E.  0.008 0.007 0.007 0.006  S.E.  0.091 0.073 0.062 0.055 
t-stat  -0.501 -0.320 -0.403 -0.500  t-stat  1.127 0.860 0.853 0.751 
Real E  -0.036 -0.025 -0.028 -0.029  Real E  -0.619 -0.417 -0.347 -0.336 
S.E.  0.034 0.021 0.020 0.019  S.E.  0.389 0.256 0.172 0.154 
t-stat  -1.080 -1.177 -1.440 -1.505  t-stat  -1.593 -1.659 -2.025 -2.186 
Ini. Inf.  0.742 0.724 0.686 0.670  Ini. Inf.  0.015 0.013 0.012 0.012 
S.E.  0.100 0.089 0.084 0.081  S.E.  0.004 0.003 0.002 0.002 
t-stat  7.465 8.130 8.142 8.280  t-stat  3.763 4.957 6.465 7.163 
Three-months Accumulated Rates  Twelve-months Accumulated Rates 
C  0.386 0.448 0.533 0.572  C  -13.740 -8.489 -1.348 -1.098 
S.E.  0.368 0.282 0.251 0.225  S.E.  3.163 2.723 1.980 1.700 
t-stat  1.065 1.598 2.125 2.538  t-stat  -4.334 -2.999 -0.680 -0.645 
Depr.  0.039 0.037 0.034 0.032  Depr.  0.531 0.398 0.363 0.356 
S.E.  0.015 0.013 0.012 0.011  S.E.  0.055 0.053 0.053 0.048 
t-stat  2.659 2.930 2.772 2.999  t-stat  9.570 7.483 6.847 7.421 
IPI  -0.003 0.001 -0.003 0.000  IPI  0.288 -0.075 -0.144 -0.162 
S.E.  0.026 0.023 0.021 0.019  S.E.  0.221 0.212 0.201 0.178 
t-stat  -0.138 0.054 -0.121 0.026  t-stat  1.306 -0.355 -0.718 -0.910 
Real E  0.031 0.001 -0.034 -0.037  Real E  -4.381 -3.366 -1.470 -1.456 
S.E.  0.102 0.069 0.058 0.055  S.E.  0.838 0.769 0.564 0.487 
t-stat  0.295 -0.007 -0.585 -0.681  t-stat  -5.223 -4.314 -2.614 -2.988 
Ini. Inf.  0.679 0.642 0.586 0.581  Ini. Inf.  0.023 0.021 0.015 0.015 
S.E.  0.099 0.091 0.086 0.081  S.E.  0.003 0.003 0.002 0.002 
t-stat  6.859 7.020 6.807 7.199  t-stat  7.822 7.760 7.130 8.261 
Six-months Accumulated Rates   
C  3.514 3.538 3.447 3.417        
S.E.  0.946 0.584 0.431 0.371        
t-stat  3.747 6.179 8.012 9.220  Notes:      
Depr.  0.008 0.009 0.010 0.012  C: Constant. 
S.E.  0.035 0.025 0.022 0.019  Depr: Accumulated depreciation over the different time 
periodst-stat  0.215 0.346 0.434 0.651  IPI: Deviation from industrial production from H-P trend. 
IPI  -0.001 -0.004 -0.012 -0.013  Real  E: Real exchange rate deviation from H-P trend. 
S.E.  0.069 0.055 0.047 0.041  Ini. Inf.: Initial Inflation. 
t-stat  -0.013 -0.084 -0.264 -0.307        
Real E  -0.142 -0.136 -0.162 -0.169        
S.E.  0.243 0.161 0.121 0.110        
t-stat  -0.587 -0.880 -1.338 -1.529        
Ini. Inf.  0.056 0.056 0.057 0.057        
S.E.  0.015 0.013 0.011 0.010        
t-stat  3.618 4.415 5.165 5.640        
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Table A.1.VIII Variability Analysis of the Nominal Exchange Rate, International 
Reserves and the Nominal Interest Rate for Developed IT Countries 
Australia 28 70.3 23.9 50 28.1 53.9 0 0
84:01 - 99:04
Canada 68.2 93.6 15.9 36.6 36.1 61.9 2.8 2.1
70:06 - 99:04
New Zealand 39.1 72.2 11.8 31.4 40.0 59.4 1.8 0.6
85:03 - 99:04
Sweden 35.1 75.5 8.9 33.3 71.8 91.1 1.3 0.0
92:11 - 99:04
Falls Within is Higher than
Probability that the Monthly Percent Change in Probability that the Monthly Change 
Depreciation International Reserves of the Nominal Interest Rate
Falls Within
 
Note: Extracted from Calvo and Reinhart (2000) 
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APPENDIX 2 
 
 
Table A.2.I. Value for the Parameters Used in the Simulation. 
Parameter Value Parameter Value 
ρ 0.5 δ 0.40 
r 4%  γ 0.80 
α 1 θ 0.90 
κ 0.5 ψ 1 
ε* 1 µ 6% 
iG 12% Π (target) 6% 
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APPENDIX 3 
 
 This appendix presents a discrete time version of the inflation framework 
presented in Chapter IV. This framework is used to illustrate the differences between 
the nominal exchange rate pass-through effects into inflation observed under a 
managed fixed exchange rate regime and under an Inflation Targeting (IT) regime.  
 As in the continuous time version of the inflation framework presented in 
Chapter III, here the law of one price is assumed to hold for the traded good price, the 
foreign price of the traded good is assumed to be one and therefore the nominal 
exchange rate is equal to the domestic price of the traded good. 
 The natural log expression for the overall price index is  
 
 httt PEP )1( ρρ −+=   (A.1) 
where Pt represents the natural log of the overall price level, Et denotes the 
natural log of the nominal exchange rate, and the natural log of the non-traded good 
price is represented by htP . Once again I assume that the non-traded good price 
responds sluggishly, specifically as a function of the changes in the nominal exchange 
rate, and the difference between the traded and the non-traded good price levels in the 
previous period. The specific natural log expression for the non-traded good price level 
is the following: 
  
  )()( 1111
h
tttt
h
t
h
t PEEEPP −−−− −+−+= γ  (A.2) 
  
 After substituting the non-traded good price level in expression (A.1) with 
expression (A.2), the overall price level expression can be rewritten as  
 
   ])[1)(1( 11 −− −−−+= t
h
ttt EPEP γρ   (A.3) 
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When the central bank is implanting an inflation target, the natural log of the 
overall price level at each point in time is determined by: 
  
       atPPt += 0   (A.4) 
where P0 denotes the initial overall price level, a denotes the rate at which the overall 
price level increases, in other words the inflation target, and t simply represents time. 
When an exogenous shock causes an increase in the nominal exchange rate, the central 
bank is forced to manage the nominal exchange rate in order to comply with the overall 
inflation target. The path that the nominal exchange rate should follow is determined 
by substituting Pt in expression (A.3) with expression (A.4) and isolating the nominal 
exchange rate, Et.  
   ])[1)(1( 110 −− −−−−+= t
h
tt EPatPE γρ  (A.5) 
For the case of the managed fixed exchange rate regime, the central bank sets a 
rate of depreciation for the domestic currency and the natural log of the nominal 
exchange rate at each point in time is determined by: 
  
    atEEt += 0   (A.6) 
where E0  denotes the initial value for the nominal exchange rate and a corresponds in 
this case to the rate of depreciation set by the central bank. In this case the path for the 
overall price level is determined by substituting (A.6) in (A.3). 
 
  ])[1)(1( 110 −− −−−++= t
h
tt EPatEP γρ  (A.7) 
 In order to analyze the nominal exchange rate pass-through effect into inflation 
under each regime, after an exogenous shock causes a sudden once an for all increase 
in the nominal exchange rate, it is possible to look at the ratio between the overall price 
level and the nominal exchange rate for both regimes.  
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Expression (A.8), r1, denotes the ratio between the overall price level and the 
nominal exchange rate for the managed fixed regime, while expression (A.9), r2, 
denotes the corresponding ratio for the IT regime. It is possible to compare the pass-
through effects between the two regimes by looking at R =  r1 / r2.  
 
Proposition 1. The pass-through effect under the managed fixed regime is 
greater or equal to the pass-through effect under IT, r1  ≥  r2. 
 
Proof.  In order for this proposition to be true, R must be greater or equal to 1. 
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 When the shock takes place, the nominal exchange rate for both regimes 
increases by α, while the overall price level only increases only by αρ, therefore 
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)1(00 ρα −++=+ atPatE  (A.11) 
 
 Plugging (A.11) into (A.10),  
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The right hand side of expression (A.14) will always be greater or equal to 1, 
since the difference between the nominal exchange rate and the non-traded good price 
level will always be equal or less than α. 
 The difference between the ratios depend on ρ, γ, and the initial shock α. If ρ is 
equal to one, then from expression (A.10) it is possible to show that both ratios are 
equal to one. When 0 ≤ ρ <1, then the ratio will depend on the value of γ.  From 
expression (A.13), if γ = 0, then r1 = r2 since the difference between the nominal 
exchange rate and the overall price level, after the shock, will always be equal to α. For 
the case in which γ = 1, using expression (A.10) again it is possible to see that r1 = r2. 
Finally, when 0< γ <1 the pass-through effect under the managed fixed regime, r1, will 
always be greater than the one observed under IT, r2, since the difference between the 
nominal exchange rate and the non-traded good price level will always be equal or less 
than α. In this case, the right hand side of expression (A.14) will always be greater than 
one and the left hand side will always be less than one.  
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